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1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petrs challenge CAll's conclusion that Ga.'s

sodomy statute implicates a fundamental right of a homosexual to
engage in private sexual activity with another consenting adult,
and CAll's holding that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for

the

(;{2A NT ~~ r('-H...t_ Cav.r-1 wi$~~ iv dL~cL._ ~c..~.Je. ~ +lu.. frD~rai i<>~c.u.

(~~ ~u~1 afts~~~'J . O~w-i!L1 bf_N'1 . .~&1\ (~u.Mj~&a.<-k~.)

City of

Richmond,

F.Supp. 1199

425

u.s.

(E.D. Va. 1975)

901

(1976),

summarily

aff'g,

403

did not prevent CAll from reaching

the merits.
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

A Ga. sodomy statute makes

it illegal to engage in oral or anal sex, and carries a penalty
of from one to 20 years in prison.

O.C.G.A. §16-6-2.

Resp Hard-

wick, a 29-year-old homosexual, was arrested for committing this
crime with a consenting male adult in the bedroom of Hardwick's
home.

Charges were filed against Hardwick and after a hearing in

Municipal Court,
DA's office

he was bound over to the Superior Court.

The

then declined to present the case to a grand

jury

unless additional evidence developed.
Hardwick and a married couple, John and Mary Doe,
are resps here)

(all three

filed a declaratory judgment action in DC seeking

to have the statute declared unconstitutional.

Hardwick alleged

in the complaint that he regularly engages in homosexual acts and
will continue

to do so.

The Does alleged that they wanted to

engage in sexual activity proscribed by the statute, but had been
chilled and deterred by the statute and Hardwick's arrest.

The

defendants, who include petr, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

The DC

(ND Ga.

Hall,

J.)

dismissed the

case on the authority of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the
City of
F.Supp.

Richmond,
1199

three-judge
Virginia

425

(E.D.
DC

U.S.

Va.

1975),

dec is ion

statute

that

901

(1976),

summarily

aff'g,

in which

the Court

affirmed

upholding

prohibited

course between adults in private.

the

const i tut ionali ty

consensual

homosexual

403

of

a
a

inter-

CAll

reversed.

Standing:

Hardwick

had

standing

there was a real and immediate threat of prosecution.
Thompson, 415

u.s.

452, 459 (1974).

because

Steffel v.

The State's past enforcement

of the statute against him raises a strong inference that the
state intends to prosecute him in the future.

Hardwick contends

that his homosexual lifestyle will lead him to violate the statute regardless of its legality.
challenge the law.

And Hardwick is well suited to

Therefore, even if the State is not threaten-

ing to enforce the law, the existence of the statute provides a
sufficient basis on which to confer

standing.

United Farm Workers National Union, 442
The Does did not have standing.

u.s.

See Babbitt v.

289, 302-03 (1979).

In the DC, the Does relied

on the existence of the statute, its literal application to their
situation, and the State's refusal to promise not to prosecute.
~

Before the appeal to CAll they did not request discovery or an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a threat of
future

prosecution.

Younger

v.

Harris,

401

u.s.

37,

40-42

(1971).
Judge Kravitch concurred on the standing issue.
Summary affirmance:
control this case.

The summary affirmance in Doe does not

A summary affirmance has binding precedential

effect, but represents approval of the judgment below and not the
reasoning.

Mandel v. Bradley, 432

u.s.

173 (1975).

The scope of

a summary affirmance is determined by examining the issues necessarily decided in reaching the result and the issues mentioned in
the jurisdictional statement.

Illinois State Board of Elections

v. Socialist Workers Party, 440

u.s.

173, 181-83 (1979).

In Doe,

the

two indicia conflict.

The

juri sd ict ional sta ternent asked

whether Virginia's sodomy statute violated constitutional rights
to privacy, due process and equal protection under the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
ground was

available:

the

plaintiffs

in

But a narrower

Doe clearly lacked

standing because they had neither been arrested nor presented any
evidence of threatened or past prosecutions under the statute.

A

lower court should presume that the case was decided on the narrower ground.

Otherwise, litigants would have too much controJ

over the scope of summary dispositions.
The fact that the Court in Doe affirmed the dismissal on the
merits does not demonstrate that the Court reached the merits of
the case.

Although an appellate court that finds a

lack of

standing normally vacates the judgment with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court has not
uniformly followed that course.

See Rizzo v. Goode, 423

(1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

u.s.

488 (1974).

u.s.

362

There is less

reason to vacate with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject
rna t ter

juri sd ict ion

if

the

case presents prudential standing

problems--as Doe appeared to--which do not bear on the power of a
court to hear the case.
Similarly, the Court was not required to dismiss for lack of
appellate jurisdiction over a three-judge court.

Appellate ju-

risdiction is conferred only when the three-judge court is properly convened.

28

u.s.c.

§1253.

When a three-judge court dis-

misses a case due to a plaintiff's lack of constitutional standing, the Court will often dismiss an appeal and vacate the judg-

ment below.

u.s.

90

Gonzalez v.

(1974).

Automatic Employees Credit Union,

419

But the Court has not held that it lacks juris-

diction over an appeal from a dismissal by a three-judge court
where the plaintiff lacks standing.

A three-judge court may be

properly convened when it could decide the case on nonconstitutional grounds.

Alexander v. Fioto, 430

u.s.

634 (1977).

There-

fore, if there was a prudential standing problem, the Court could
affirm a dismissal by a three-judge court.
Judge

Kravitch dissented,

case.

A summary affirmance

case.

Hicks v. Miranda, 442

tional

statement,

court

which

a

that

Doe governed

this

is a decision on the merits of a

u.s.

limits

interpretations of

finding

332, 344 (1975).

The jurisdic-

the range of permissible lower

summary disposition,

mentioned

the

substantive contitutional issues in the case but did not mention
the issue of standing.

Most important, if the plaintiffs in Doe

lacked standing,

the Court would not have had

juri sd ict ion to

decide the case.

The Court would have had to dismiss the appeal

instead of summarily affirming the lower court, which had decided
the case on the merits.

This would have been the case whether

the lack of standing was on constitutional or prudential grounds.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367

u.s.

497, 509 (1961).

Judge Kravitch conceded that the Court does not always vacate the judgment and remand for dismissal when it finds that the
plaintiffs lacked standing.

But the crucial issue is whether the

Court could have summarily affirmed the lower court in Doe on the
basis of

lack of standing,

would have been required.

or whether dismissal of the appeal
In Rizzo and O'Shea, the cases cited

by the majority, the Court reversed a lower court decision rendered on the merits in favor of the plaintiffs.

The Court cites

no case in which the Court has affirmed, on the basis of lack of
standing, a lower court decision rendered on the merits in favor
of the defendants.
The majority said that even if Doe had resolved the merits,
later cases

indicate

question as open.
688 n.

that

the Court

views the constitutional

In Carey v. Population Services, 431 u.s. 678,

5 (1977), the Court stated that it was not reaching the

quest ion of ~h_{(c~-~r and to what extent the Canst i tut ion prohibits
state

statutes

among adults.
with Doe.

regulating

private

consensual

sexual

behavior

A dissent criticized that language as conflicting

The Court also indicated that the constitutionality of

a state law prohibiting consensual sodomy had been raised in New
York v. Uplinger, cert. granted, 104 S.Ct. 64

(1983), dismissed

as improvidently granted, 104 s.ct. 2332 (1984).
Judge Kravitch did not think the question was open.

Carey

simply acknowledges that the Court has not yet passed on the
validity of many kinds of state statutes regulating sexual conduct.

It does not purport to overrule cases such as Doe.

The

majority also infers too much from the dismissal of the writ of
cert in Uplinger.
Merits:

The Court's right of privacy cases prohibit state

interference with certain decisions critical to personal autonomy.

The Court has indicated that the intimate associations pro-

tected by the Constitution are not limited to those with a procreative purpose.

See Griswold v.

Connecticut,

381 u.s.

479

(1965)

(striking down state law prohibiting the use of contracep-

tives because it interfered with sanctity of marriage relationship):

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434

u.s.

374, 385-86 (1978)

(listing

"associational interests" and procreation as separate interests
protected

by

the

right

to marry) .

The

intimate

associations

protected against state interference extend beyond the marriage
relationship.
hibiting

See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405

distribution

unconstitutional
differently) •

of

treats

because

"For

contraceptives

some,

married

u.s.

438 (1972)

(pro-

to

unmarried

persons

and

unmarried

persons

the sexual activity in question here

serves the same purpose as the intimacy of marriage," CAll said.
In addition, having privacy in one's home covers some activities

that would not normally merit constitutional protect ion.

See Payton v. New York,
Georgia, 394

u.s.

445 U.S.

557 (1969)

573, 589-90

(1980): Stanley v.

(unconstitutional to criminalize the

possession of obscene films in one's home).

Hardwick presents an

interest at least as substantial to that in Stanley, and one that
presents no public ramifications.
CAll found that the statute implicated a fundamental right
protected by the Ninth Amendment and by substantive due process.
Accordingly, CAll remanded the case for trial, at which time the
State must prove a compelling interest in regulating this behavior and a narrowly drawn statute.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends

that CAll's decision con-

flicts with the CADC's opinion in Dronenburg v.
1388, 1392, reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579

Zech, 741 F.2d

(CADC 1984), which found

that Doe was binding on the lower courts as a decision on the

-

merits.

0

-

Dronenberg also held that the Court's privacy cases do

not cover a right to engage in homosexual conduct.

Id., at 1395-

96.
Decisions related purely to sexual gratification have been
regulated by government throughout the history of Western civilization.

By contrast,

the Court said

in Roe v. Wade,

410

u.s.

113, 140 (1973), that at the time the Constitution was adopted, a
woman had a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy
than she did in 1973.

But no similar right to engage in sodomy

existed or was contemplated when the Constitution was adopted.
Therefore, sodomy of any kind,

including that which takes place

in private, cannot be considered a fundamental right or implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.
The Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413

u.s.

49

(1973) permitted States to make unprovable assumptions lacking in
scientifically certain

criteria

interest in order and morality.
States'

ability

to

legislate

in

order

to

protect

a

social

CAll's opinion will impede the

in any

area

touching

upon moral

issues, and calls into question statutes proscribing such personal conduct as suicide, prostitution, polygamy, adultery, fornication, and the private possession and use of illegal drugs.
Resps largely adopt CAll's arguments in contending that Doe
does not constitute binding precedent.

This Court employed simi-

lar reasoning in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S.

416

(1983)

summary affirmance.

in discussing the precedential effects of a
Other circuits have interpreted Doe similar-

ly, see Rich v. Sec'y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 n. 8 (CAlO

1984);

Beller v.

Middendorf,

632 F.2d

have the highest courts of New York,

788,

809

(CA9 1980); as

New Jersey, and Maryland.

In addition, Doe did not address any claim of a First Amendment
right of association, which is involved here.
The

Court

should

not

statute unconstitutional.

grant cert.
Rather,

CAll did not hold the

it stated an appropriate con-

stitutional test in the abstract and remanded the case for trial.
Accordingly, review by this Court is premature.
ally concedes

the case

The State virtu-

is premature by filing a petn for cert

rather than an appeal pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§12S4(2) from a deci-

sion holding a state statute unconstitutional.
The prematurity of
with

any

other

Circuit.

the case precludes it from conflicting
Moreover,

Dronenburg

case, and its discussion of Doe was dicta.

was

a

At issue there was

the constitutionality of a naval discharge regulation,
the military sodomy law.

military

and not

The case indicated that the standard by

which military regulations must be judged is much lower than in a
civilian context.

Dronenburg v. Zech, supra, at 1392.

In addi-

tion, there is no ripe conflict between this case and CAS's decision in Baker v. Wade, slip op. No. 82-1S90 (CAS August 26, 198S)
(en bane).

Baker, like this case,

involved a declaratory judg-

ment challenge to the constitutionality of a state sodomy law,
and CAS reversed the DC's holding that the law was unconstitutional.

Baker v. Wade, SS3 F.Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982).

Since

the issues here are not framed concretely yet, there is no conflict with Baker.

'

.

On the merits, resps' argument is similar to CAll's opinion.
Affirming CAll will not wreak havoc on the States.
States

have

courts

in

deer iminali zed

two other

private

States have

homosexual

struck down

Twenty-two

acts,

and

the

sodomy statutes.

States will still be able to prohibit suicide, drug abuse, prostitution, and bigamy.
4.

~here

DISCUSSION:

is no bar to granting cert in a case

where a CA has disposed of an appeal from a final judgment in a
way that requires further action in the DC.
v. Gamble, 429

u.s.

97, 98

(1976)

See, e.g., Estelle

(CA reversed DC's dismissal of

§1983 complaint and remanded with instructions to reinstate complaint;

Court

granted

cert

over

dissent

stating

normal practice is to deny interlocutory review,
Butz

v.

Economou,

u.s.

438

478,

480-481

(1978)

that

Court's

id., at 114);
(DC dismissed

action on ground of absolute immunity; CA reversed, finding officials entitled to qualified immunity).

Although the Court has at

times suggested that such a CA ruling must be "fundamental to the
further conduct of the case,"
any CA reversal of a

final

that standard is arguably met by

judgment that requires further pro-

ceedings, See 17 Wright, Miller and Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure §4036, at 23-24
the other hand,

(1978),

and is met in this case.

the Court has also denied cert on the grounds

that the case is not ripe for review.
Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v.
327, 328 (1967)
it

for

Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros.

..

See e.g., Brotherhood of

Bangor

& A.R. Co., 389

u.s.

("because the Court of Appeals remanded the case,

is not yet ripe

'•.

On

review by this Court"); Hamilton-Brown
&

Co., 240 U.S.

251, 258

(1916)

(lack of

---

finality

"funi shed

su ff ic ient

ground

for

the

denial") .

These

cases thus could support a decision either way.
Hardwick appears to have standing, so that would be no bar
to taking the case either,

even though the Does will probably

drop out for lack of standing.
The debate between the CAll majority and dissent about the
L--

......

--"""?

summary affirmance standards does not control this Court's decision on whether to reconsider the issue in Doe.

Summary deci-

sions carry less authority in this Court than do opinions rendered after plenary consideration, and the Court needs less justification for

reconsidering them.

San Diego,

u.s.

4S3

490, SOO

(1981)

Metromedia,

Inc. v. City of

(plurality)

(citing cases).

"It is not at all unusual for the Court to find it appropriate to
give full consideration to a question that has been the subject
of previous summary action."

~

(quoting Washington v. Yakima

Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 477 n. 20 (1979)).
It is clear that the issue here is important enough to merit
the Court's attention.
the

case

if

The Court is procedurally able to decide

it wants to.

CAll's decision is

in confict with

CAS's in Baker, and Dronenburg adds to the debate.
in Baker
encounter.

forbid

engaging

CAS held

in oral or anal sex

The statute

in a homosexual

that Doe controlled and that engaging

in

homosexual conduct was therefore not a protected liberty interest.

CAS also rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claim,

finding that homosexuals were not a suspect class, and that the
"strong ob' ction to homosexual conduct, which has prevailed in
Western culture for the past seven centuries" provided a rational

basis for upholding the statute.
at 6448.

Baker v. Wade,

There . is also a case pending befor

n which the DC

eterosexual adults who
engage in sexual activity in private.

Doe v. Duling, 603 F.Supp.

960

Last term, this Court af-

(E.D. va. 1985), appeal pending.

firmed by an equally divided Court a CAlO case that upheld an
Okla. statute providing that teachers could be fired for "public
homosexual activity,"

but struck down a

restrict ion on their

"public homosexual conduct," which included advocacy.
of the City of Oklahoma City v. National
s.ct. 1858

Bd. of Ed.

Gay Task Force, 105

(1985), aff'd by an equally divided court, 729 F.2d

12 7 0 ( CA 10 19 8 4) .
The Court could put off the confrontation by allowing this
case to go to trial for development of the facts and presentation
of the state interest.

It is possible that CAll next time will

hear the case en bane and come out the other way.

Also, the

Court may want to delay in the hope that it will receive a case
raising the issue in the context of heterosexuals,

in which it

might be less controversial and a smaller step to find a right of
sexual privacy.
On the other hand,

it does not seem essential to have a

trial before deciding the constitutional issue.

The Court does

not need additional facts to decide the case, and the State can
present its interests in its brief to this Court.

Also, CAll is

unlikely to go en bane on the appeal from the trial.

If CAll

wanted to address en bane the essential issue in this case, it

would have done so with this opinion.

While a case involving

heterosexuals will likely filter up from CA4 or a similar case
might arise, heterosexuals may run into greater standing problems
~------~--~---------------------------~

than does resp here.

In the CA4 case, the unmarried, heterosex-

ual adult plaintiffs had engaged in sex and cohabited with other
unmarrieds, and desire to do so in the future although they have
abstained since the filing of the suit, partly because they fear
prosecution.

The defendants said there was a low probability of

prosecution, but admitted that the statutes would be enforced if
complaints were received and they had manpower available.
Duling, 603 F.Supp., supra, at 964.

Doe v.

Further, although it would

be a smaller step to find a right of sexual privacy among heteros~ ,

it might be difficult to preclude homosexuals from its

coverage.

And perhaps homosexuals need the protection more.

the Court finds no right to sexual privacy,

If

it might be more

desirable to render such a decision in case involving homosexuals.

The Court might also want to grant cert to discuss what

standards it wishes CAs to apply in connection with summary affirmances.
5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I

recommen~.

There is a response.

September 25, 1985

Morrison

Opn in petn

\~ro:

Justice Powell

FROM:

Bill

DATE:

September 28, 1985

RE:

Bowers v. Hardwick, et al., No. 85-140
Cert petition

This

petn

raises

statute criminalizing

the

sodom

question

whether

a

state

is constitutional under

the

line of cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

u.s.

479

The

(1965).

Court summarily affirmed a

three-

L.._._ _ _ __

judge ,__.-------·--......
DC decision that such a statute is constitutional in

------

Doe

v.

Commonwealth's

Since Doe,

Attorney,

the Court has declined

See Carey v.

u.s.

425

Population Services,

901

to discuss
431

u.s.

(1976).

the

678,

issue.

688 n.

5

(1977).
In this case,
controlling,

since

~1

the
the

found that

Court's

summary

(1)

Doe was not

affirmance

might

have been based on standing concerns and not a decision on
the merits, and
Georgia

sodomy

(2)

under the right-to- privacy cases, the

statute

·•'

is

unconstitutional.

Judge

~Kravi tch
is

authored a persuasive dissent,
Judge

control! ing.

Court's
would

decision
have

had

Kravitch

been

dismissed

based

the

arguing that Doe

contended
on

appeal

that

standing,

rather

than

if

the

the

Court

summarily

affirming.
Since

v

the

CAll's

decision

was

rendered

in

this

case, CAS (en bane, Reavley writing for the court) decided
s~hat

in a

Doe controls

and

that the Texas
Baker

sodomy

v.

Wade,

769 F. 2d 289 (CAS 198S).
There
and

wait

is

for

an argument

the

DC

that the Court should deny,

to try

the case on remand.

(CAll

remanded for trial on the question whether the statute is
a narrowly tailored means of advancing a compelling state
interest.)

Unlike the memo writer, I think this argument

is strong.

The decision in this case is an important one

that may have
private
use).

-

record.

implications

conduct

(e.g. ,

The Court should

for

some

other

kinds

of

forms of regulated
recreational drug

therefore decide

it on a proper

(It's possible the state wi 11 be able to make a

record for the proposition that this statute is related to
state efforts

to control various diseases:

that kind of

interest would be hard for the state to discuss adequately
in an appellate brief.)

I

On

the

hand,

this case gives

the Court

an

opportunity to decide the issue without discussing it (if
that's

what

appeared
binding

the Court wishes

to

accomplish,

-

effect

Court could

I

other

'----

of

take

the

and

to do).

That

the

misunderstood

summary

aff irrnance

in

Doe.

'

affirmances.

'

~--~

federal

The

That would

reverse the CAll's deci~ion in this case, and

other

the

this case and wr~3! bri_g_f opinion on

the proper application of summar
(1)

CAll

is what Doe

courts r on
r

notice

that

recommend

DENY

?Doe

(2) put

decided

this

issue.
Consequently,

I

I

unless

the

Court

wishes to decide the merits issue simply by discussing the
I

procedural issue -- the effect of summary affirmances .

•'i. ~'¥l .....

>,

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

tlrennan
Marshall
Blackmun
Powell
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

From:

Justice White
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
GEORGIA v. MICHAEL HARDWICK, AND JOHN
AND MARY DOE
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 85-140. Decided October-, 1985

JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.
On August 3, 1982, respondent Michael Hardwick was arrested for committing the crime of sodomy with a consenting
male adult within his home in violation of Georgia law. See
0. C. G. A. § 16-6-2 (1984). * Charges were brought, and
Hardwick was bound over to the Superior Court. At that
point, however, the Atlanta District Attorney's office determined that it would not present the case to the grand jury
unless further evidence was developed.
Hardwick, along with the married couple of John and Mary
Doe, then filed this suit in the U. S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, asking that the Georgia sodomy statute be declared unconstitutional. The defendants in
the suit were various Georgia officials, who are the petitioners here. Hardwick alleged that he was a practicing homosexual, that he regularly engaged in homosexual acts, and
that he intended to continue to do so in the future. The Does
*Section 16-6-2 provides as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy
when he commits sodomy with force and against the will of the other
person.
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. A person convicted of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by imprisonment for life or by ·imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20
years.
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alleged that they wanted to participate in sexual activity proscribed by the statute but that they had been "chilled and deterred" by the statute and by Hardwick's arrest.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a claim, and the District Court granted the motion.
It ruled that the Does had no standing to bring the suit and
that Hardwick, although he had standing, had no actionable
claim in light of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the
City of Richmond, 425 U. S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp.
1199 (ED Va. 1975). In Doe, this Court summarily affirmed
a three-judge District Court's judgment upholding a Virginia
criminal sodomy law against constitutional challenge.
A panel of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir- L
cuit reversed. All three members of the panel first conCluded that the District Court had correctly found that
H rdwic had standin to brin the suit but that the Does did
not. Turning to the merits o Hardwick's claim, the panel
iiia,]ority then determined that Doe was not controlling. The
majority concluded that, although only the constitutional issues were presented in the jurisdictional statement in Doe,
this Court's summary affirmance of the District Court's judgment there could have been based on a determination that
the Doe plaintiffs lacked standing to sue (since they presented no evidence of past or threatened prosecutions under
the statute). Noting that a lower court should read a summary disposition as being based on the narrowest grounds
possible, the majority concluded that Doe did not control the
disposition of the constitutional questions raised by
Hardwick.
The majority found sup~ for this conclusion in recent actions of this Court. See· Carey v. Population Services, 431
U. S. 678, 688, n. 5 (1977) (noting that "the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults").
See also ~nger, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (per

A
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curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted in case involving state statute prohibiting loitering in
public places for the purpose of soliciting "deviate sexual behavior"). These decisions, concluded the panel majority, indicate that the constitutional question presented here is still
open for consideration.
Turning to the merits of the constitutional questions presented, the majorit found that the Georgia statute did infringe HardWic 's fun amental constitutional rights: It implicated his private associational interests-interests which the
majority found were particularly strong where he planned to
carry out his sexual activities in the privacy of h~ home.
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). See als<f'Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969). Thus, the majority determined
that the statute could only be upheld if it were shown by the
state to serve a co~ interest and to be
the most narrowly drawn means of serving that interest.
One judge dissented from the panel's decision on the merits. The dissent concluded that Doe controlled. The dissent
observed t~ere would have meant that
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The appeal was
not dismissed for want of jurisdiction, however, and the summary affirmance thus indicates that Doe was a decision on the
merits of the constitutional issues. The dissent also disagreed with the inferences the majority drew from Carey and
Uplinger: Carey simply indicated that this Court has not yet
passed on many statutes regulating sexual conduct, and the
majority inferred too much from the dismissal of the writ in
Uplinger.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case that Doe is not
controlling prece ent con lets With decisions ~her ircw~ Wad;,769 F. 2d 289, 292 (CM/1985) (en
bane) (upholding state sodomy law based on determination
that Doe is controlling); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F. 2d 1388,
1391-1392 ~ 1984) (indicating that Doe should probably
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be held to control on question of constitutional rights respecting homosexual activities). Further, the majority's determination, assuming that Doe does not control, that
Hardwick's constitutional rights have been infringed conflicts
with the conclusion of the District of Columbia Circuit that no
constitutional right to engage in homosexual conduct exists.
See Dronenburg, supra, 741 F. 2d, at 1397. Given this lack
of consistency among the Circuits on this important constitutional question, I would grant the petition.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

March 29, 1986

Mike

No. 85-140

Bowers v. Hardwick

On Writ of Certiorari to the CAll

QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the constitutional right of privacy give respondent
a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy?
...__FACTS
Respondent Bowers was arrested for violation of Georgia
Code Ann. §16-6-2(a)

(1984), which states that "A person commits

the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another."

..

'

The county attorney decided that there was insuffi-

page 2.

cient evidence to prosecute.

The state has until August 3, 1986

to present the case to a grand jury if it chooses to do so.
cause he

Be-

is still under the threat of possible prosecution, re-

spondent brought suit in the Northern District of Georgia on Feb.
14, 1983.
Georgia

His complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the
statute

was

unconstitutional.

The

DC

disposed

of

Hardwick's claims by citation to this Court's summary affirmance
in

Doe

v.

Commonwealth's Attorney,

1975), aff'd, 425

u.s.

the statute

implicates

involve

of

activity

any

with

the

901 (1976).

children

or

F.Supp.

rights,

and

ramifications"
with

1199

The CAll rev'd.

fundamental

"public

403

persons

who

are

Va.

It held that

that

that

(E.D.

it did not

attend

"sexual

coerced either

through physical force or commercial inducement."

App. 26.

The

CAll distinguished Doe on very flimsy grounds, and if the Court
was of the mind to do so, it could simply reverse on the basis of
the CAll's misapprehension of the precedential value of a summary
affirmance,

as explained very well

in Judge Kravitch's dissent.

Because I do not think the Court ought to take that approach,
will not discuss the Doe issue.

I

The CAll remanded for trial in

order to allow the State to show, if it could, that it had a compelling interest in support of the statute.

This Court granted

cert from that decision.
DISCUSSION
A

It is extremely important to set out what this case is
not about.

Mr.

Tribe and some of the amici

frame

this case in

page 3.

apocalyptic terms that would require this Court to answer a host
of questions not presented by the case.
1. This case is not about state regulation of sexual conduct between married partners.
r ied

couple

("John

prosecution lacked
Court.

In

and

Both courts below agreed that the marMary Doe")

standing.

addition,

the

who only alleged

a

fear

of

Their claims are not before this

state

practically

statute cannot apply to married couples.

concedes

For

that

the

the same reason,

the statute's application to unmarried heterosexual partners is

_____,

not before the Court.

Because the statute is subject to a limit-

ing construction, the Court only should consider the precise application of the statute presented by this
omy.

~

case- ~homosexual sod- ~~
IAA

\

2. This is not a case about the means chosen to enforce the statute,

or

the

range

of

punishment

available

under

the

statute.

Hardwick has not yet been prosecuted for the violation;
the

Court

point.

knows,

he

may

be

acquitted.

This

is

-----

important

to

~-

put

someone

in prison

for

that offense.

that is a separate issue not raised in this case.
whether

an

for all

It may be constitutionally permissible for the State to

impermissible

a

certain punishment

is

impermissible,

But

The question

even though

the

State may criminalize or otherwise discourage the conduct, is a
question of proportionality.

u.s.

~~

j

"'Y""'t

277

(1983),

Your opinion in Solem v. Helm, 463

articulated the principles for determining un-

constitutionally disproportionate punishment.

I

think

it would

be entirely proper for the Court, in some future case, to consid-

er the proportionality of, e.g., imprisonment for an offense like
homosexual sodomy or adultery.

In that future case,

I would be

-

inclined to conclude that criminalizing certain conduct could be
constitutionally disproportionate to the conduct at issue.

Jus-

tice Harlan implied as much in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367

u.s.

497, 547-548

(1961)

("the moral presupposition on which ap-

pellants ask us to pass judgment could form the basis of a variety of legal rules and administrative choices, each presenting a
different issue for adjudication.")

But that issue is not pre-

sented here.
Similarly,

and as you noted in your file memo, this is

not a case that requires a judgment about what one would do as a
legislator, but about what the Constitution does or does not forbid

the State

from

regulating.

That

self-evident

point

gets lost in the discussion of this case in the briefs.

often

The fact

that notable authorities support decriminalization, or that such
a result would be fairer or more tolerant than the existing statute,

are

the

sort of argument one makes to a

legislature.

In

fact, those very arguments have successfully been made to twenty-

~ 3 AJ~t~s
~

to date.

This Court's task is not to

d-;;;;:de ~

what the "best" statute would be, but only to decide whether the

~~~onstitution

forbids the one Georgia has chosen.

~-' 3. This is not a case about the "sanctity of the home."
exists a right of homosexual sodomy,
the

home,

areas,

although

the

state

If there

it would not be limited to

presumably

could

regulate

some

like homosexual "bath houses," on public health grounds.

The fact

that

the arrest here took place

in the home does not

q

page 5.

It may well

strengthen the case for the existence of the right.

be appropriate to look at the "sanctity of the home" argument in
a case where the Court is evaluating the propriety of the means
of enforcement, but as I have said, that question is not presented

for

The

here.

respondent's

argument

a fundamental
right

u.s.

394

557

(1969).

Stanley, how-1!

ever,

case

involving

freedom of

, ...

thought:

"Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds."
Respondent's
our

argument

fantasies

that

alone"

the

"home surely protects more than
just

is

mistaken

thought/action distinction is an important one.

-

.__

~

Id., at 565.

------.

rhetoric.

The

A man may fanta-

size all he wants in his home about using cocaine or battering
his wife,

but if he actually does either,

the State is free to

punish him notwithstanding the fact that the conduct took place
in his home.
Respondent cites other cases in support of this point.
They

almost

all

are Fourth Amendment

cases.

One

of

v

the most

egregious
misuses of a case
is respondent's citation to Oliver v.
,
..

~t

~*
~I

United States, 466
setting for

~

u.s.

170, 179 (1984)

those intimate activities that the Fourth Amendment

is intended to shelter from governmental interference.")

~ ac; wy

is a case about the

J"a

a marijuana

r. •
1
'./..

'i~

(the home "provide[s] the

~
&~

search of

"ope~ne"

field

a mile

Oliver

and involved

from petitioner's house.

The quoted sentence actually reads that "open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment

?...

~,-- ~ ~

t~J I 11 ~1

t-r

page o.

is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance."

Only by such strained reading of standard Fourth Amend-

rnent cases is respondent able to obtain authority for the argurnent that the sanctity of the horne affects this case.

Obviously

respondent is entitled to the protection that the Fourth Amendrnent gives to every person in his horne, whether or not this behavior was properly made a crime.
not

speak

to whether

But the Fourth Amendment does

the State can make something a cr irne,

or

otherwise punish certain behavior.
B

Once the range of issues is properly narrowed, this case
presents a fairly discrete legal issue:
right of privacy protect the

-------.
right to

Does the constitutional

engage in homosexual sod-

orny?
1. What is the source of the right of privacy?

There is no right

of privacy specifically mentioned in the Constitution.

The Court

has long recognized that this right "emanates from the penumbras"
of the specific sections of the Constitution.
Poe v.

Ullman specifically linked

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'

the

right

Justice Harlan in
of

privac*1 to the

guarentee of protection against

the deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process

-.

of law.

Poe, 367

u.s.,

at 540.

His reasoning was that a right

of privacy is contained within the protection of
process~ -an

2.

What

~ ubstantive due

analysis that has since become generally accepted.

are

Justice ever

the

limits on the

right of privacy?

Almost every

to write an opinion based on the right of privacy

has treated like a very dangerous, but necessary, tool.

--------

Each has

page 7.

been

careful

to

u.s.

Cleveland, 431
need

for

that

494, 502

the

substantive due

(opinion of POWELL, J.)

(1976)

caution arises out of

limits on the
limits

reiterate

the

fact

judicial recognition of a

that there are so few
1

t ight

of privacy.

that do exist do not come from any external source,

from the

~w~osed

~Harlan's
instructive.

a. ?t

The

The
but

limits found in its cases.

in Poe v. Ullman once again_!j'

He St-atet~ -th at "[e)ach new claim to Constitutional

protection must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes,

as they have been rationally perceive and his-

torically developed."

Id., at 544.

History and tradition figure

prominently in many other statements regarding the limits to the

--

right ~ -

tional

limit

to

Justice Goldgerg, who struggled to find a
the

right

of

privacy,

instructed

that

ra- ~

judges

"must look at the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our
~--------------------------~---people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there]
as to be ranked as fundamental.'"
381

u.s.,

tradition

at 493.
as

"only personal

an

Griswold v. Connecticut,

Moore v. City of East Cleveland also refers to
important

rights

guide.

V"'"

Roe

v.

that can be deemed

Wade

explained

'fundamental'

or

that
'im-

plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut
are

u.s.,

included

in

this

gu ifentee of personal privacy."

410

at 152.
The focus on history and tradition results from the fact

that the right of privacy is not intended to be the vanguard of
changes in societal values.

It is intended to protect those val-

-

ues that are imbedded in the fabric of our society, not to imbed
new values

into that fabric of its own force.

One good reason

for that conservative approach is to protect against "constitutionalizing" temporary mood swings in our society.
thing

can

be

recognized

as

a ' I fundamental

"'
right,

Before someit

must

have

shown the permanence----------~-----------------------to establish itself in the history and tra-

-------------------------------------------------------------------

ditions of our people.

T~r;-_a__n_d__~
_r_a_d__i_t ~ seems

indi~ate

that

homosexual sodomy does not fit within the right of privacy.

Not

to

even respondent attempts to argue that our history and tradition
have recognized homosexual sodomy as "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."
recognized

the

Instead,

fundamental

he argues that our society has long
value of

intimate sexual

relations.

But this Court's right of privacy cases have never recognized a
broad-based

right

of

sexual

freedom.

Instead,

it has extended

(
protection to those • sexual
relationships'' that have traditionally

been protected and recognized in , our society--those that relate
( (

to

marriage

and

other

family

,,

relationships.

Up

through

the

present time, every one of the Court's right of privacy cases can

-

--

be explained in terms of a concern for the fundamental right of

...____

marital and family privacy.

;

While a fuller explanation will fol-

low oral argument, a brief summary may illustrate the point.
1. The child rearing and education cases: This group of cases is
illustrated by Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268

u.s.

510 (1925),

involving a law requiring all parents to send their young children to public schools.

The Court recognized a parental to di-

rect the upbringing of their children, and that the "fundamental

theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only."

u.s.,

268
/1

at 535.

•

\'

•

•

•

2. The marital sexual privacy cases: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

u.s.

479

(1965)

illustrates the point that the Court has protect-

----------

ed decisions about marital sexuality from state intrusion.
3.

Cases about the decision to marry:

u.s.

374

(1978)

Zablocki v.

Redhail,

invalidated a state statute that imposed a sig-

nificant burden on the decision of some people to marry.
opinion concurring
impediments

to

434

in the

marriage

judgment,

were

In your

you cautioned that not all

impermissible.

You

recognized

a

"right of marital and family privacy which place some substantive
limits on

the

regulatory power of government"

"is one of the basic civil
the

right of man,"

collective

because marriage

but noted that "the

State,

representing

expression of

moral

aspira-

tions,

has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of

domestic relations relfect the widely held values of its people.
State

regulation

has

included

bans on

incest,

bigamy,

and

homosexuality ... A 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast
doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned

to govern marriage

and divorce."

also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
tecting the

Id.,

u.s.

at
494

398-399.
(1977)

right of an extended family to live together.

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416

u.s.

same protection to six college roommates) .

See
(proCf.

1 (1974), denying the

J:"-'";J-

--·

3. The abortion cases: These cases also reflect the Court's limit
of the right of privacy to marriage and family.

The state stat-

utes that prohibit or severely limit access to an abortion have
the effect of forcing a woman to bring a family into existence.
For

unmarried

about

her

women,

commitment

the
to

abortion
her

decision

sexual

is

partner;

it

not

a

decision

is

a

decision

about long-term commitments to her potential offspring.

It in-

volves a relationship at least as protected as the husband-wife
relationship--the relationship of a mother and her child.

It is

not her interest in sexual freedom that protects even an unmarried minor's

right

to an abortion;

rather,

it is her potential

relationship and commitment to a child she does not want to bear-her

interest

in

not

having

the state require her

to become a

mother.
Without

belaboring

the

point,

I

am convinced that the

right of privacy as it relates to this case has been limited thus
far

to marriage

and other

family

relationships,

family and the right of potential procreation.

protecting the

These values have

properly been found by the Court to be fundamental, even essential,

to our society.

So limited, the right of privacy does not

extend to protect "sexual freedom"

in the absence of the funda-

mental values of family and procreation.
Moreover,

I believe that it is important that the right

of privacy be so limited.

Presently, the right of privacy can be

explained in terms of the fundamental values of marriage, family,
and procreation.

That represents one of the few limits on a very

broad constitutional principle.

Respondent does not seek to get

around that limit by arguing that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental value.

Rather, he contends that the right of privacy ex-

tends to personal sexual conduct regardless of any relationship
to marriage, family, or procreation.
fundamental
mind.

value,

then

If that is recognized as a

no limiting principle comes readily to

Areas that long have been held to be within the tradition-

al concern of the States will have to be justified in terms of
their effect on personal sexual freedom.

If, for example, a man

is entitled to consensual sexual freedom with the partner of his
choice, what principle allows the state to prevent him from paying for sex with a willing partner?

Respondent's reply is that

the state can regulate prostitution as commerce.
how

commerce

would

justify

a

state

from

I

cannot see

criminalizing

conduct

that the parties have a fundamental right to engage in.

If the

state cannot regulate the sexual conduct of a man with one partner, on what basis can it regulate his conduct with more than one
partner?

These questions do not have easy answers once the right

of privacy leaves the confines of marriage, family,

and procre-

ation and enters the expanding world of personal sexuality.
More
privacy cases

importantly,

I

are

to marriage,

limited

think

the

fact

that

family,

free~m

be,
That

is a

newcom~r

a~ur

as discussed earlier,
may

be

reflected

in

a

national

right

of

and procreation

accurately reflects the traditions of our people.
at

the

Personal sexu-

v~lues,

and may well

temporary national mood that fades.
the

fact

that

in

the

1970's

twenty

states decriminalized homosexual sodomy, while in the 1980's only
two states have done so.

This healthy "laboratory of experimen-

f

tation" among the different states properly reflects the differing and sometimes changing values of our people, even from state
to state.

I would respect those differences.

The right of pri-

vacy calls for the greatest judicial restraint, invalidating only
those

laws

country.

that

impinge on those values

I do not think that this case involves any such value.

I recommend reversal.

'\'

...

that are basic to our

March 31, 1986
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Bowers v. Hardwick (CAll)
To be argued March 31

MEMO TO Mike:
This case,

that we

should not have

taken,

involves

the validity of the Georgia statute that makes sodomy a
misdemeanor.

The facts are straight forward

use that term in this case!).
homosexual,

was

arrested

for

(if one can

Respondent Hardwick, a male
committing

sodomy

consenting male adult in the bedroom of his home.

with

a

After

charges were brought, the district attorney decided not to
present the case to the grand jury.
is

a

felony

of

some

level).

(Possibly the crime

Although

not

convicted,

Hardwick filed this suit in federal district court seeking
a declaration that the Georgia statute is unconstitutional
as applied to a private homosexual act.
In

addition

to

Hardwick,

a

married

couple

called

"John and Mary Doe" also joined the complaint, asserting
generally that they also engaged in such conduct and were
concerned about the possibility of arrest.
The threshold issue with respect to both respondents
is

whether

or

not

they

had

standing.

The

Court

of

.....

Appeals,

(Johnson and Tuttle) concluded that the threat of

prosecution

under

the

statute

enforcement against Hardwick
standing.
John

It

and

found

Mary

-

no basis

Doe.

in

of

its

past

was adequate to give him
for

Judge

light

standing on behalf of

Kravitch

agreed

with

the

majority of CAll on the standing issues.
On the merits, the threshold question was whether the
Court of Appeals was bound by our summary affirmance of a
three-judge

district

Virginia's

Sodomy

court,

sustaining

statute,

in

Doe

case

concluded

affirmance,

it

was

bound

validity

of

Commonwealth's
901.
by

The DC in

this

summary

but_again Judges Johnson and Tuttle of CAll

concluded
decisions

that

v.

u.s.

Attorney of the City of Richmond, 425
this

the

-

in

light

of

that

the

Court

various
of

follow our decision in Doe.

dicta

in

Appeals was

subsequent
free

Judge Kravitch,

not

in a

to

brief

dissent, believed that the Court of Appeals was "bound" by
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
If I were on a Court of Appeals,

I would agree with

Judge Kravitch that our summary affirmance in the Virginia
case

never

overruled

was

controlling.

I

know,

however, from experience here that this Court can usually
find

a

way

not

to

follow

a

summary

affirmance.

See

Mandale

v.

certainly
Kravitch

Bradley,
consider

and

u.s.

432

joining

the DC

173.

four

to

Although
agree

that we would have

I

would

with

Judge

to overrule the

Virginia case before reaching the merits here, my guess is
that a majority of the Court will decide that language in
subsequent

cases

(see

Judge

Johnson's

opinion)

signaled

that the validity of private consensual sodomy was an open
question.
The question is now presented to us in the narrowest
possible
blown

Professor

terms.

rhetoric,

does

Tribe,

focus

his

with

claim

his
in

usual

the

over-

narrowest

possible language:
"Whether the state of Georgia may send its
police into private bedrooms to arrest adults
for
engaging
in
consensual,
non-commer ical
sexual acts, with no justification beyond the
assertion that those acts are immoral".
Again,
extend

its

citizens

Professor Tribe argues
"criminal

law

that Georgia may not

into the very bedrooms of

to break up wholly consensual

between willing

adults."

sexual

its

relations

One also may be surprised,

in

the context of sodomy, to have Professor Tribe repeatedly
referring to the "sanctity of the home".

In view of my age, general background and convictions
as to what is best for society, I think a good deal can be
said for the validity of statutes that criminalize sodomy.
If

it

becomes

itself will

sufficiently

be

wide-spread,

civilization

severely weakened as the perpetuation of

the human race depends on normal sexual relations just as
is true in the animal world.
Despite

the

foregoing,

if

I

were

in

the

state

legislature I would vote to decriminalize sodomy.

It is

widely prevalent in some places (e.g., San Francisco), and
is

a

criminal

statute

that

almost

never

is

enforced.

Moreover, police have more important responsibilities than
snooping

around

sodomy.

But the question here

would do.
I

trying

to

catch

people

in

is not what a

the

act

of

legislator

The legislatures of a majority of the states -

believe

continued

since
to

the

founding

criminalize

determine whether

of

the

Republic

sodomy,

and

our

duty

have
is

to

such statutes violate rights protected

by the Constitution.
As

the

briefs

all

recognize,

there

explicit in the Constitution on this subject.
Court

has

frequently

recognized

that

there

is

nothing
Yet,

are

this
human

rights that can be derived from the concept of liberty in

.Jo

the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Roe v. Wade,

in which the Court

and privacy interests and

The most dramatic example

derived

(6-3)

found that liberty

from the Bill of Rights

particularly the Fourteenth Amendment

abortion

decision

discussions

of

prior

this

to

viability.

subject

that

I

Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v.
beginning at 539.
Harlan

explicitly

Incidentally,
refers

is

-

support the

One

of

the

am familiar

with

u.s.

Ullman, 367

best
is

497,

in that dissent, Justice

to homosexuality as not within

the right of privacy that he found to exist with respect
to the use of contraceptives.

See pp. 546 and 553.

It is clear that, as in Roe v. Wade,
is

whether

there

is

a

substantive

due

the issue here
process

within the meaning of liberty and privacy private,

consensual

sodomy.

At

right -

to engage in

present,

I

think

substantial arguments can be made on both sides of
question.

this

The weight of modern thinking at least supports

decriminalization.

See

The

Model

Criminal

Code,

and

resolutions cited in Tribe's brief adopted by a number of
national

organizations

denominations.
with

respect

including

A different view,
to

whether

the

several

however,

Constitution

invalidation of a criminal statute.

church

may be
requires

taken
the

It

is

tempting

to

accept

made by Professor Tribe.
it

is

later

impossible

in

the

very

narrow

argument

Apart from other considerations,

any

realistic

sense

to detect

convict adult citizens who engage consensually

and
in

homosexual conduct in a truly private setting- e.g., what
fairly may be called home.
Tribe

refers

argument
"Home"

to the

I must say that when Professor

"sanctity of

repellant.

Also

it

the

is

home",

I

find his

insensitive

advocacy.

is one of the most beautiful words in the English

language.

It usually connotes family,

husband and wife,

and children - although, of course, single persons, widows
and widowers, and others also have genuine homes.
A

problem

principle
Appeals

would

if we are

and

be

room,

Professor

a

identify

some

limiting

inclined to agree with the Court of
Tribe.

questions come to mind:
hotel

to

mobile

A number

of

examples

and

would the term "home" embrace a

trailer

(yes,

I

think),

a private

room made available in a house of prostitution or even in
a

public

bar,

the

"sanctity"

of

a

toilet

in

a

public

restroom?
And

if

constitutional
adultery.

sodomy
grounds,

is

to

what

be
about

decriminalized
incest,

bigamy

on
and

Incidentally, is there a Supreme Court decision

holding that bigamy is unconstitutional?
for me to see why a husband

It is not easy

in the privacy of two homes

should not lawfully have two wives if liberty and privacy
derived

from

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

require

invalidation of anti-sodomy laws.
As you can see, Mike, I am not talking very much like
a lawyer.

There are a number of cases cited in the briefs

that perhaps

are

relevant.

It might be

helpful

if you

identify only the very few that are any where near close.
Possibly

Griswold

v.

Connecticut,

Services, and possibly Eisenstadt v.

Carey

v.

Population

Baird, are relevant.

Both parties rely on my decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.

If

that

case

is

relevant

to any extent,

it

would support reversal.
In sum, Mike, I am sorry you had to be burdened with
this

case.

after

the

would,

I
oral

however,

probably will
arguments
like a

and

not make

up my mind

Conference

summary memo as

should be analyzed.
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MEMO TO Mike:
This ca·se,

that we

should not have taken,

involves

the validity of the Georgia statute that makes sodomy a
misdemeanor.

The facts are straight forward

use that term in this case!).
homosexual,

was

arrested

for

(if one can

Respondent Hardwick, a male
committing

sodomy

consenting male adult in the bedroom of his home.

with

a

After

charges were brought, the district attorney decided not to
present the case to the grand jury.
is

a

felony

of

some

level).

(Possibly the crime

Although

not

convicted,

Hardwick filed this suit in federal district court seeking
a declaration that the Georgia statute is unconstitutional
as applied to a private homosexual act.
In

addition

to

Hardwick,

a

married

couple

called

"John and Mary Doe" also joined the complaint, asserting
generally that they also engaged in such conduct and were
concerned about the possibility of arrest.
The threshold issue with respect to both respondents
is

whether

or

not

they

had

standing.

The

Court

of

Appeals,

(Johnson and Tuttle) concluded that the threat of

prosecution

under

the

statute

enforcement against Hardwick
standing.

It

John

Mary

and

found

-

no basis

Doe.

in

of

its

past

was adequate to give him
for

Judge

light

standing

Kravitch

on

agreed

behalf of
with

the

majority of CAll on the standing issues.
On the merits, the threshold question was whether the
Court of Appeals was bound by our summary affirmance of a
three-judge

district

Virginia's

Sodomy

court,

sustaining

statute,

in

Doe

case

concluded

affirmance,

it

was

bound

validity

of

Commonwealth's
901.
by

The DC in

this

summary

but_again Judges Johnson and Tuttle of CAll

concluded
decisions

that

v.

u.s.

Attorney of the City of Richmond, 425
this

the

-

in

light

of

that

the

Court

follow our decision

various
of

in Doe.

dicta

Appeals

in

was

subsequent
free

Judge Kravi tch,

not

to

in a brief

dissent, believed that the Court of Appeals was "bound" by
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.
If I were on a Court of Appeals,

I would agree with

Judge Kravitch that our summary affirmance in the _Virginia
case

never

however,

from experience here that this Court can usually

find

a

way

overruled

not

to

follow

was

a

controlling.

summary

I

affirmance.

know,

See

Mandale

v.

certainly
Kravi tch

Bradley,
consider

and

u.s.

432

joining

the DC

173.

four

to

Although
agree

that we would have

I

would

with

Judge

to overrule the

Virginia case before reaching the merits here, my guess is
that a majority of the Court will decide that language in
subsequent cases

(see

Judge

Johnson's

opinion)

signaled

that the validity of private consensual sodomy was an open
question.
The question is now presented to us in the narrowest
possible
blown

Professor

terms.

rhetoric,

does

Tribe,

focus

his

with

claim

his
in

usual

the

over-

narrowest

possible language:
"Whether the state of Georgia may send its
police into private bedrooms to arrest adults
for
engaging
in
consensual,
non-commerical
sexual acts, with no justification beyond the
assertion that those acts are immoral".
Again,
extend

its

citizens

to

Professor
"criminal

Tribe argues
law

into

that Georgia may not

the very bedrooms of

break up wholly consensual

between willing

adults."

sexual

its

relations

One also may be surprised,

in

the context of sodomy, to have Professor Tribe repeatedly
referring to the "sanctity of the home".

In view of my age, general background and convictions
as to what is best for society, I think a good deal can be
said for the validity of statutes that criminalize sodomy.
If

it

becomes

itself will

be

sufficiently

wide-spread,

civilization

severely weakened as the perpetuation of

the human race depends on normal sexual relations just as
is true in the animal world.
Despite

the

foregoing,

if

I

were

in

the

state

legislature I would vote to deer iminal ize sodomy.

It is

widely prevalent in some places (e.g., San Francisco), and
is

a

criminal

statute

that

almost

never

is

enforced.

Moreover, police have more important responsibilities than
snooping
sodomy.

around

trying

to

catch

But the question here

people

in

the

act

of

is not what a legislator

would do.

The legislatures of a majority of the states -

I

since

believe

continued

to

the

founding

criminalize

of

the

Republic

sodomy,

and

our

have

duty

is

to

determine whether such statutes violate rights protected
by the Constitution.
As

the

briefs

all

recognize,

there

explicit in the Constitution on this subject.
Court

has

frequently

recognized

that

there

is

nothing
Yet,

are

this
human

rights that can be derived from the concept of liberty in

the

The most dramatic example

Fourteenth Amendment.

Roe v. Wade,

in which the Court {6-3)

and privacy interests and

found that liberty

derived from the Bill of Rights

particularly the Fourteenth Amendment -

abortion

decision

discussions

of

prior

this

to

viability.

subject

that

I

support

One

of

the

am familiar

Harlan

explicitly

Incidentally,
refers

the
best

with

u.s.

Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367
beginning at 539.

is

is

497,

in that dissent, Justice

to homosexuality as

not

within

the right of privacy that he found to exist with respect
to the use of contraceptives.

See pp. 546 and 553.

It is clear that, as in Roe v. Wade, the issue here
is

whether

there

is

a

substantive

due

process

within the meaning of liberty and privacy private,

consensual

sodomy.

At

right

-

to engage in

present,

I

think

substantial arguments can be made on both sides of this
question.

The weight of modern thinking at least supports

decriminalization.

See

The

Model

Criminal

Code,

and

resolutions cited in Tribe's brief adopted by a number of
national

organizations

denominations.
with

respect

including

A different view,
to

whether

the

several

however,

Constitution

invalidation of a criminal statute.

church

may be
requires

taken
the

•

It

is

tempting

to

accept

made by Professor Tribe.
it

is

later

impossible

in

the

very

narrow

argument

Apart from other considerations,

any

realistic

sense

to detect

convict adult citizens who engage consensually

and
in

homosexual conduct in a truly private setting- e.g., what
fairly may be called home.
Tribe

refers

argument
"Home"

to

the

I must say that when Professor

"sanctity of

repellant.

Also

it

the

is

home",

I

find his

insensitive

advocacy.

is one of the most beautiful words in the English

language.

It usually connotes family,

husband and wife,

and children - although, of course, single persons, widows
and widowers, and others also have genuine homes.
A

problem

principle
Appeals

would

if we are

and

be

room,

Professor

a

identify

some

limiting

inclined to agree with the Court of
Tribe.

questions come to mind:
hotel

to

mobile

A number

of

examples

and

would the term "home" embrace a

trailer

(yes,

I

think),

a

private

room made available in a house of prostitution or even in
a

public

bar,

the

"sanctity"

of

a

toilet

in

a

public

restroom?
if
ional

sodomy
grounds,

is

to

what

be
about

decriminalized
incest,

bigamy

on
and

Incidentally, is there a Supreme Court decision

holding that bigamy is unconstitutional?

It is not easy

for me to see why a husband i'n the privacy of two homes
should not lawfully have two wives if liberty and privacy
derived

from

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

require

invalidation of anti-sodomy laws.
As you can see, Mike, I am not talking very much like
a lawyer.
that

There are a number of cases cited in the briefs

perhaps

are

relevant.

It might be helpful

if you

identify only the very few that are any where near close.
Possibly

Griswold

v.

Connecticut,

Carey

v.

Population

Services, and possibly Eisenstadt v. Baird, are relevant.
Both parties rely on my decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.

If

that

case

is

relevant

to any extent,

it

would support reversal.
In sum, Mike, I am sorry you had to be burdened with
this

case.

I

after

the

oral

would,

however,

probably will
arguments
1 ike

a

and

not make

Conference

summary memo as

should be analyzed.
LFP, JR .
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To: Justice Powell

zs-.. lt~-o

From: Mike

Re: Oral argument in Bowers v. Hardwick

"'Date: March 31, 1986

1.

In

response

stated

that

to your

the

question

principle

regarding

incest,

that distinguished an

Prof.

Tribe

incest statute

from this one was that the state could logically assume that a
daughter never could truly consent to sex with her father.
ignores many other
cest.

forms of

incest,

such as brother-sister

That
in-

The importance of this ommission is not that it points up

some technical

flaw

in his argument.

Rather,

it

illustrates a

If a brother and sis-

central concern

ter are adults, and use contraception or abortion to prevent an
~

unhealthy

~ statute

--

child,

then

the

scendingly--dismissed
_____,
moral principle.
state does

---------

(1973)

interest behind a

forbidding sexual contact between them is that it thinks

interest is morally wrong.

See,

state's only real

e.g.,

the

Yet Mr. Tribe repeatedly--and condestate's

interest

in

legislating

·But this Court repeatedly has stated that the

have

a legitimate interest in legislating morality.
~
~------------------------------Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 u.s. 49, 60

("there

is a

'right of

the Nation and of

the States to

maintain a decent society'" quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
184, 199

some

(1964)

(Warren, C.J., dissenting);

Massachusetts, 383

u.s.

413, 457 (1966)

u.s.

see also Memoirs v.

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

The logic of Mr. Tribe's position is expansive.

He con-

tends that if an activity takes place in the home, and is consen-

~ ·/

sual and does not do physical damage or pose a health risk
debatable proposition with regard to homosexual sodomy)
state

cannot

thinks

it

regulate

is wrong

it

merely

on

or dehumanizing.

the

basis

that

(a

then the
the

state

That logically implicates

recreational drug use, at least with marijuana, incest, suicide,

--

and bestiality.
"""""""'" .......

Moreover,

on moral grounds,

if the state cannot defend a statute

I do not see a strong alternative grounds for

criminalizing prostitution.
somehow rely on its power

Tribe's response that the state can
to regulate commerce seems absurd to

me, once the underlying activity is said to implicate a fundamental

right.

His

repeated denial of any valid

state purpose in

enacting legislation backed up only by a moral interest has serious implications for pornography laws as well.

In addition, I do

not see how his limiting principle that the state's power to enforce contracts would allow the state to regulate adultery and
bigamy works, if all parties are consenting adults.
Justice Stevens appeared to think that the state did not
really have an important interest in this statute, because it did
not prosecute this case when it was handed to them on a "silver
platter."

He

relied

that he committed

the

on

the

acts

intended do so in the future.

fact

that

respondent had

admitted

in his civil complaint and that he
First, the fact that Fulton County

attorney declined to prosecute this case does not implicate the
state at all.

The state does not tell the county attorney which

cases to prosecute, and the county attorney in Fulton County {Atlanta) may well have views on these matters that differ from the
State •

•

<

Second,

the fact

that a person admits something in his

civil complaint does not mean that he would be willing to do so
in his criminal prosecution.

Nor does the fact that he states

his intention to violate the law in the future help the state at
all.

%£"·11/.D IJ~vl-f~ ·

-

(P~!r-v-~~ ~~~ ~

,/..41..-.L~ J.Li-c.. ~ ~)

1.

You raised the possibility that the Constitution might

protect homosexual relationships that resemble marriage--

~

stable, monogomous relationships involving members of the

~
same sex.
I think this is not a good approach, for
~/"several reasons.
First, this Court has held that the
~1
J.,v1ur Constitution protects marriage largely because marriage
:1J!. 0,

j

7
~~

~~
d-"'~~

has

traditionally

society.
J

.

,

been

fostered

Poe v. Ullman, 367

dissenting)

(marriage

u.s.
is

and

protected

497, 553 (1961)

"an

institution

in

our

(Harlan,

which

the

State not only must allow, but which always and in every
age

it

has

marriage

fostered

that

clearly

is

our

and

protected") •

society

heterosexual,

has

not

But

the

traditionally

homosexual.

It

kind

of

protected
would

be

bootstrapping to say that marriage is protected because of
our

history and

relationships

tradition,

are

and then add that homosexual

protected

they

because

"resemble"

marriage.
Second,
heterosexual
status,

you

once

you

"marriages"
would

conclude
are

necessarily

of

that

homosexual

equal

suggest

Constitutional

that

have a right to adopt and raise children.

and

homosexuals

Further, states

would have great difficulty justifying other restrictions
on

homosexuality--such

as

no

avowed

homosexual

public

L..

school teachers--since the Constitution would place homoand heterosexual relationships on a par with each other.
These possibilities suggest that the

"marriage"

idea has

too many implications for other cases that you might wish
to decide differently.

Better to take a course

in this

case that leaves open other, closer cases.

2.
.)';"' to

~

.•

~

v·

~·

here.

~ Am~

" ~~ ('

~

you

9

There are two other "middle courses" available

bars

~

~

you

could

criminalizing

decide

private,

conduct between consenting adults,

~here

the

~ th

consensual

sexual

that

the conduct

not cause demonstrable physical or psychological

does ?~

injury] )

All human beings have a physical and psychological drive
to have sex; moreover,

virtually all people satisfy that

drive from time to time.
to

stigmatize

someone

It would be "cruel and unusual"
as

a

criminal

for

satisfying

a

physical/psychological urge shared by all people in a way
that 1 s

common

injure anyone.

in

society

Thus,

the

and

that

doesn 1 t

demonstrably

state could not put people

in

jail for having sex at all, or even for having sex outside

3.

marriage.

respondent alleges 1 that he has

And

the same

kind of urge to have sex as most heterosexuals have.
punish

for

acting

on

that

urge,

To

in

a

concededly private setting and with a consenting partner,
~

~~--

is morally equivalent to punishing heterosexuals.

~

2

~/U.~S .

This kind of approach does have some case support.
In Robinson v. California, 370
invalidated
being a

a

drug addict.

Court relied
one's

statute

that

u.s.

660 (1962), the Court

criminalized

the

status

Justice Stewart's opinion for

of
the

in part on the fact that one couldn't help

physical

desires,

and

equated

the

punishment

at

issue to imprisoning someone "for the 'crime' of having a
common cold."

u.s.

514

Robinson
drunk
....._......

-->

370

u.s.,

at 667.

In Powell v. Texas, 392

(1968), five members Qf the Court concluded that
also

when

forbids

the

criminalizing

.....________
actor

is

an

the

-act

alcoholic. 2

of getting

Those

five

lThis case arises on the state's motion to dismiss,
which was granted by the DC.
(CAll reversed that grant.)
Thus, respondent's al e ations about his own homosexuality
must be ta en as true.
~

2The Court actually affirmed the conviction in Powell,
but Justice White, the critical fifth vote to affirm, did
so on the ground that the defendant was not compelled to
be drunk li. n public ~
Justice White made clear that his
vote would have been different had the state simply
punished drunkenness.

4.

Justices

reasoned

that

" [ c] r iminal penal ties may not be

inflicted

upon a

person

for

being

in a

condition he

is

powerless to change."

Id., at 567 (Fortas, J., joined by

IX:>uglas,

BRENNAN,

Stewart,

id.,

548

at

and

(WHITE,

J.,

JJ.,

dissenting);

concurring

in

the

accord

judgment).
\~

Ll

Moreover, the Justices applied the principle to conduct-getting
,..._

.

intoxicated--that was naturally compelled by the

"condition" that the defendant was "powerless to change."

f

According

\ change"

to

his

Hardwick,

respondent
status

as

a

-

he

homosexual.

is

"powerless

Having

sex

another man is naturally compelled by that status.

to

with
Powell

is therefore fairly persuasive support for a holding that
he may not be criminally punished merely for having sex.3

l

3 This argument does not prevent the state from punishing
drug possession, even by addicts.
An addict's first use
of
an
adc1icti ve
drug
is
usually
voluntary,
while
respondent's first experience with sex was naturally
im e e
y n1
reex1st1n
urges.
. e alcoholic
in Powell 1s more . 1 e ne omosexual than the drug addict
because the alcoholic's first drink, while voluntary, was
not in any way blameworthy.
Society permits--and even
encourages--drinking in many circumstances.)
Moreover,
drug
use causes demonstrable social
evils.
That simply isn't the c_gse with respec€ t:o~he
private ract1ce -o~ity.
Thus, tne scate would
have an
ve whe m1ng 1 eres
in punishing the use of
illegal drugs, while its interest in punishing homosexual
conduct must be much less substantial.
Finally, the state can advance whatever interests
(Footnote continued)

!>.

3.

The

other

middle

approach

is

narrower.

could apply your decision in Solem v. Helm,
(1983)

to

Georgia's

statute

and

hold

463
that

You

u.s.

277

it

is

disproportionate to sentence someone to 1
or more in jail merely for a consensual, private sex
The argument would be similar to the argument I just
made, except that you would stop short of decriminalizing
'~

this kind of conduct altog~ther.

This has the virtue of

leaving more options open for the future.

?

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
it has in this case by means other than criminalizing sex.
The state might seek-ro--Dar- homosexuals from teaChing in
public schools, or might advertise its disapproval of
homosexuality to children and adolescents.
Such actions
are like discouraging excessive consumption of liquor,
which would be constitutional even after Powell v. Texas.

To: Justice Powell
Re: Robinson/Powell argument in Bowers v. Hardwick
There are two possible uses of the Robinson/Powell
argument raised in last night's memo.
1. You could--quite properly--describe the case as only raising

-

-,____

the question whether the Constitution embodies a fundamental
to engage in homosexual sodomy.
vote to reverse.

On that basis, you could

You could explain, however, that if the issue

of the constitutionality of the punishment were presented, you
would hold it unconstitutional to imprison someone for sodomy on
the basis of Robinson/Powell.

You could make that argument in a

concurring opinion (if the majority votes to reverse) or a
separate dissenting opinion (if a majority recognizes a
fundamental right).

The argument would then be av~ilable in the

first case that squarely raises the constitutionality of the
punishment.

C~

b_e_~o supp~rt

2. The Robinson/Powell argument als_o__c_o_ u_ l_ d___

~~ffirmance,

~

but for different reasons than expressed by the CAll.

ou could say that respondent has raised a facial challenge to

~~alidity

of the statute, and that

~~~sian can
~y ~~horized

be viewed in the abstract. . Viewed that way, it

at least one year and as much as twenty years

~prisonment
~ nder

theref~ its p~hment

for sodomy.

You could conclude that

~sentencing

the statute would violate the Eighth Amendment, and that

therefore the statute is facially unconstitutional.
with that position is that (i)

.'

The problem

the arguement has not been briefed

or argued by the parties or explained in any court opinion, and
(ii) it is not the "ususal" method of Eighth Amendment analysis,
which examines the actual punishment given in a particular case.
Neither of these is an insurmountable obstacle.

If the majority

was to affirm, you would then be in a position of concurring in
the judgment.
The strength of both positions is that it removes the
-=

fundamental unfairness of the statute without getting into the
~---------~
serious problems that would accompany recognition of a
fundamental right.

~:

Justice Powell

From: Mike
Re: Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140
Date: April 2, 1986

Georgia Code Ann. §16-6-2 makes sodomy a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more
than 20 years.

~

The same section also defines the crime of

aggravated sodomy, and authorizes a greater punishment.

The

Virginia statute at issue in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney made
sodomy a Class 6 felony punishable by not less than one year nor
more than five years in prison.
As to the Robinson/Powell argument, the three of us who
worked on the theory last night--Anne, Bill, and !--continue to
recommend that you use that theory to vote to reverse and write
~-------------

here.

~

This petr has not yet suffered, nor does it appear likely

that he will suffer, any imprisonment.

If he or someone else is

convicted and sentenced, this argument will be available.We
believe that it would be a mistake to create a fundamental right
to protect this conduct.

.

The Chief Justice ~ .
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

April 3, 1986
PERSONAL

RE: Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140

Dear Lewis:

12..L,~

"""-"

~~

~ct..~~

~ -U /~---
~ ?4 J/1-t. ~~
'-'1A-

.J~~~~
t.-Vk k ~I hci-

J~k~
I have some further thoughts on your suggestion at Conference
that Hardwick cannot be punished because of hi~ "status" as a h~osex
ual.
<d- ~~~ .

s~~ ~r~)tfo/%

I suggest to you that this argument is not before us. Hardwick's
complaint seeking a declaratory judgment contains no such claim. The
argument was certainly not pressed at all by Hardwick's counsel in his
brief or at oral argument. Hardwick's brief does not even cite either
the Eighth Amendment or Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660 (1962).
There are only two citat1ons to Robinson in the sixteen briefs that
have been filed. The Amicus Brief of the Lambda Legal Defense Fund,
at 20, cites Robinson merely in passing. The Amicus Brief for the
Lesbian Rights ProJect, at 25 n.46, cites Robinson 1n a footnote, but
even that group concedes that there is "an 1nteresting debate", yet to
be resolved, about whether homosexuality is "a matter of genes ••• or
of personal choice." Id., at 24-25.
You will remember my "degree" in Psychiatry, which led me to be
very skeptical about that breed of M.D.'s. I have never heard of any
responsible member (or even an "avant-garde" member) of the A.P.A. who
recognized homosexuality as an "addiction" in the sense of drug addiction. It is simply without any basis in medicine, science, or common
human experience. In fact these homosexuals themselves proclaim this
is a matter of sexual "preference." Moreover, even if homosexuality
is somehow conditioned, the decision to commit an act of sodomy is a
choice, pure and simple -- maybe not so pure!
We can only speculate as to why Hardwick did not make this particular argument that you advance. Maybe Hardwick did not want to
become subject to "compulsory treatment programs," Robinson, suara, at
665, that are prescribed for "helpless" people like narcotics a diets.
But whatever the reason, are we really to ignore the theory of
Hardwick's lawsuit and render an opinion on entirely different grounds
without the guidance of any briefing or argument or even history?

Even if I thought that the Eighth Amendment issue were before us,
I would reject it for the same reason that I reject the Fourteenth
Amendment argument actually made by Hardwick. Both arguments are extremely dangerous because they prove far too much. The Fourteenth
Amendment argument goes !9.Q __f_C!£_. g_ec~use there is no llmi ting principle
that would allow the -states to criminalize incest, prostitution or any
other "consensual" sexual activity. Moreover, it would forbid the
states from adopting any sort of policy that would exclude homosexuals
from class rooms or state-sponsored boys' clubs and Boy Scout adult
leadership.
The Eighth Amendment argument, while it avoids (at least for the
present) the "sfiPpery slope" of the Fourteenth Amendment argument,
creates a p~n~_<J.!_ea~r mi~QhJef. Georgia here criminalizes
only the act of sodomy. If the act of sodomy is a "status," then what
about the acts of ince_st, exhibi t:.ionism, ~, and drug possession. A
drug addict must necessarily "possess" drug and can be convicted -- at
least up to now -- for possession. In short, your argument would
swallow up centuries of criminal law since anyone who could has a psychological dependency would be entitled to carry out (at least in private or with a consenting par~ner) whatever is necessary to satisfy
his cravings.
/

~

There is no evidence that Hardwick is a "compulsive" homosexual
so as to have even a colorable Eighth Amendment claim. See Powell v.
vy Texas, 392 u.s. 514, 552 n.4 (1968) (WHITE, J., concurring). Homosex~~~
·
allty is obviously not the same as addiction to narcotics.
By defi~J~
nition, one has the "status" of a narcotics addict only if one is
physically compelled to take narcotics, but even that's controllable.
0
But surely homosexuals are not "sex crazed" automatons who are "compelled" by their "status" to gratify their sexual appetites only by
~
committing sodomy. Heterosexuals, after all, manage to live in a society where sexual activities are often proscribed except within the
bonds of marriage.
c~~(

Y

The record simply does not remotely support a conclusion that
sodomy is compulsive. Moreover, I seriously doubt whether medical
evidence would support this notion for all or even many homosexuals.
It is extremely unlikely that what Western Civilization has for centuries viewed as a volitional, reprehensible act is, in reality, merely
a conditioned response to which moral blame may not attach. Are those
with an "orientation" towards rape to be let off merely because they
allege that the act of rape is "irresistible" to them? Are we to excuse every "Jack the Ripper?"
Hardwick merely wishes to seek his own form of sexual gratification. Undoubtedly there are also those in society who wish seek gratification through incest,
drug
use, gambling, exhibitionism, prostitu,
------·--·----71"

;

- 3 •

tion, ~~, and what not7 such persons may even file complaints in
federal court avering that they "regularly engage" in the prohibited
acts and "will do so in the future." Complaint, in J.A., at 3. But
that hardly establishes a basis for upholding a facial challenge to an
otherwise valid statute. As Justice Holmes put it, "pretty much all
law consists in forbidding men to do some things that they want to do
" Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 u.s. 525, 568 (1923)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
April 13, an unlucky
will mark m 30th year on the Bench.
This case presents for me the os far reaching issu of those _IQ_
~s.
I hope you will excus
e energy with w 1c I have stated my
views, and I hope you will g' e them earnest consideration.
Regards,

Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 8, 1986

Re:

85-140 - Bowers v. Hardwick

Dear Lewis:
Your letter, which expresses some uncertainty as
to whether your final vote would be one to reverse or
to affirm brings to mind the disposition of the Court
in Coleman v. Miller, 307 u.s. 433, 446-447, where
the Court, with all nine Justices participating,
disposed of the question whether the Lieutenant
Governor of Kansas was part of t
a e
1
ature,
by stating that the Court was 11 qually divide 11 on
the issue.
Maybe we should follow a similar co
case.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

in this

April 8 , 1986

85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE :
At Conference last week, I expressea the view that
in some cases it would violate the Eighth Amendment to imprison a person for a private act of homosexual sodomy. 1
continue to think that in such cases imprisonment would constitute cruel and unusual Punishment. 1 relied primarllv on
Robinson v . California.
At Conference, given my view as to the Eighth
Amendment, mv vote was to affirm but on this qroun~ rather
than the view of four other Justic~~ that there was a violation of a fundamental substantive constitutional right - as
CAll held. 1 did not agree that there is a ~ubstantive due
process right to engage in conduct that for centuries has
been recognized as deviant, and not in the best interest of
preserving humanity . 1 may say qenerally, that 1 also hesitate to create another substantive due process right.
1 write this memorandum today because upon further
study as to exactly what is before us, 1 conclude that my
"bottom line" should be to reverse rather. than affirm. The
only question presented by the parties is the substantive
due process issue, and - as several of you noted at Conference - my Eighth Amendment view was not addressed by the
court below or by the parties .

In sum, my more carefully considered view is that 1
will vote to reverse but will write separately to explain my
view of this case qenerally . 1 will not know, until 1 see
the writing, whether 1 can ioin an opinion finding no substantive due process right or simply join the iudqment .

L• .F . P., Jr .
ss

··.

·

.iUFtmt Qfcnri of tlrt~~ ,itatte
._uJringto~ ~. (ij. 2Up)!.~
CHAMI!IE:RS 01"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

April 9, 1986
85-140 - Bowers v. Hardwick
Dear Byron:
In light of Lewis' memo of April 8th, this will serve as an
assignment to you of the above case. A revised list will be
along soon.

Justice Byron White
Copies to the Conference

~mtt

<qourtltf tq~ ~b ~hdtg

._,asJrin.gtMt. ~. <q. 2ll~Jl..;t
CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

April 21, 1986

Re:

No. 85-140, Bowers v. Hardwick

Dear Byron:
In due course, I shall try my hand at a dissent in
this case.

Justice White
cc: The Conference

''

•'

~uprtm.t

Clfttttrt of tlft }tnittb ~tatte

'IIJaeltinghm, ~.

elf.
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CHAMeER S OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

April 22, 1986

Re:

No. 85-140-Bowers v. Hardwick

Dear Byron:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice White
cc:

..

The Conference

Apr i 1 2 2 , 1 9 8 6

:;~~

~k
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick

~A /lM

.t:rh--

~~~~~g(;1
'

~.

Dear Byron:
1 will join the judgment but will probably write

separately.
Sincerely,

Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

'.

.Snprtmt <lfltltrl of tlrt ~~a .itzmg
jiasfring~ ~. <!}. 20bi~~
CHAMBERS O r

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 23, 1986
Re:

NO. 85-140

Bowers v. Harwick

Dear Byron,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice White
cc:

The Conference

•

1

lfp/ss 05/21/86
MEMORANDUM
TO:

DATE:

Mike

May 21, 1986

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick
I
White's

have

opinion

consideration
opinion.

of

now

reviewed

(third
your

more

think

I

can

join

to
his

It is well written, and I particularly like what

he has said about substantive due process.
on my

Justice

subject

and

draft),

views

carefully

opinion

in Moore

v.

He even relies

City of East Cleveland -

an

opinion I believe Byron criticized at the time.
I still intend to write separately relying on the
Eighth Amendment.

It is not yet entirely clear how I can

justify writing in view of Byron's flat reversal of CAll,
the

effect of

which

is

to

sustain

the

validity of

the

Georgia statute.
Even if I only join the judgment, Hardwick can be
prosecuted and may well be in view of the publicity given
this case.
view of

the

Moreover, he sought a declaratory judgment in
"threat"

of prosecution.

I

therefore could

reason that if Hardwick's concern becomes a reality,

the

.~.

··.

2.

Eighth Amendment -

not addressed in the Court's opinion -

could be considered.
Perhaps

I

should not say categorically that the

Eighth Amendment applies
not before us.
the

in this case,

as

that

issue

is

The substance of my opinion would be that

applicability

of

that

amendment

is

depending on the facts developed at trial -

a

question

that could be

addressed.
After

we

Chambers draft, I
your list.

ss

get

your

Court

opinion

as

far

as

a

suggest you put this case at the . top of

9~~~
To: Justice Powell
From: Mike

WlU ~ ~f ~ ~-./t~.
~j~~tAJ

'
~,Lo~~~

Re: Bowers v. Hardwick, No. 85-140

I

~ ~~ _...&;;kzp;a:s ...~

Date: June 12, 1986

~~~J'M_~

~~~-~~

This memo discusses the problems I have with the Eighth
Amendment theories on which you would base
this case, and a recommended solution.

r ez

urrence in

~

I

.

/

~."'-

~d.e~ ~

(~(~)

One basis for a concurrence that you have considered is
based on two cases, Robinson v. California, 370
and Powell v. Texas, 392

u.s.

514 (1968).

acting on a compulsion they cannot

660

The

I have two problems

5' ~ ~

with using this approach:
1. Lack of case support.

u.s.

d"2...(_

S~v~

In Robinson the Court merely lneid that

In Bowers the state is not

a state could not make a person's status a crime, i.e., the
status of being a drug addict.

attempting to criminalize the status of being a homosexual, it is
criminalizing actual conduct.

Robinson does not provide any real

support, other than the fact that it introduced the concept of
Eighth Amendment analysis to compulsions.

In Powell, your

concurrence would not be based on the majority opinion at all,
which affirmed the conviction.

(Majority opinion was authored by

Justice MARSHALL; separate concurrence by Black, joined by

.

'

Harlan)

Instead, it is based on the dissenting opinion of

~

Justice Fortas, combined with Justice WHITE's opinion concurring
in the judgment.

The dissenters would have excused the

compulsion of alcoholism, plus the acting out of that compulsion
by drinking or taking drugs.

As Justice Fortas put it, criminal

penalties may not be inflicted upon a person "for being in a
position he is powerless to change," or if "the condition
essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the pattern
of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of
the disease."

Id. at 567, 569.

That is, Powell could not be

punished for being drunk, nor could he be punished for being
drunk in public, since once he was drunk he could not control
where he went.

Justice WHITE agreed except to say that on the

facts of Powell it appeared that he could have avoided being in
public.
This is an alarmingly broad principle to use as support;
my impression is that it is not in accordance with your general
views.

1~
We could, of course, limit the principle ourselves.

Even

so, this theory does not fit well into any "compulsion" analysis.
As can be seen from Robinson and Powell, the "compulsion" cases
involve, and depend for their validity on, the sort of compulsion
that completely removes a person's ability to choose how he will
act.

In other words, the relevant compulsions are those that are

strong enough so that acting on the compulsion is not a
volitional act.

There is a great deal of discussion in Powell as

to degrees of alcoholism, so that the case, even for the

. '•

• . • •' \ ; ol:i

,,
·.'

dissenters, turned on that degree of alcoholism that completely
controls and dominates its victim.

In Bowers, the relevant

compulsion is the human sex drive.

While that drive is strong, I

do not think that it can be compared even remotely to a

1 ~ compulsion
~

that removes one's volition, or that dominates the

will so that one is literally not accountable for one's actions.
The drive to have sexual relations is not like heroin addiction,
and the notion that people cannot be held accountable for their
sexual behavior is, again, one that I suspect is not consistent
with your views.
2. Broad application.

As can be seen from the above discussion,

a second cause for concern with this theory is its potentially
broad application.

I will not describe this concern in any

detail, but the main point is that it would excuse from
accountability the acting out of any compulsion which one is
powerless to control, including those actions outside the horne
ich are the natural result of the compulsion and which are not
acts of volition.

The implications for drug enforcement are one

concern, as well as the possible constitutionalization of one
version of the insanity defense, something the Court has wisely
declined to do many times.
I would recommend rejecting the above argument if it were
presented to you by another opinion writer.

I certainly would

not recommend adopting this theory in one of your own opinions.
II
The second Eighth Amendment theory is based on your
decision in Solem v. Helm, 463

u.s.

277 (1983).

Helm sets out a

proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment.

The case

involved a life sentence for passing a bad check under a South
Dakota recidivist statute.

You could, in Bowers, suggest that it

would violate the proportionality aspect of the Eighth Amendment
to jail a man for sodomy.

The only obstacle to that is that in

Bowers no sentence has actually been imposed.

In addition,

because four Justices apparently stand ready to adopt almost any
standard you set out if and when the next case comes up, your
brief concurrence could wind up being a court opinion and
committing you to a position.

For that reason, if you decide to

use the proportionality theory, I suggest leaving yourself as
much flexibililty as possible for the future.

Rather than any

lengthy exposition, in which you attempt to distinguish a
permissible sentence from an impermissible sentence, I suggest a
very brief statement, no more than a paragraph, along the
following lines:
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. I agree with the Court that
there is no fundamental right such as the one
respondent argues for in this case. My own view is
that the constitutional provision that protects
respondent is the Eighth Amendment, see Solem v. Helm,
463 u.s. 277 (1983). Respondent has not even been
tried, much less convicted and sentenced. Moreover,
the parties have not raised any Eighth Amendment issue.
For these reasons, no Eighth Amendment argument is
before us. I would wait to decide the applicability of
the Eighth Amendment to cases such as this one until
such time as a sentence actually is imposed.
The above paragraph merely announces your view that the
Eighth Amendment applies, and the general theory by which it
applies.

It has the virtue of not "slapping down" a state in

advance for a disproportionate sentence, when in fact no sentence
has been imposed.

In addition, I think it no accident that no

sentence has been imposed.

To the extent that your

constitutional concern is that persons not be sent to jail for
homosexual conduct, it is better to wait until someone actually
is sentenced before resolving this very thorny issue.

If that

never happens, then your basic constitutional concern that people
not be sent to jail for homosexual conduct will have been
satisfied.
CONCLUSION
I recommend that you join Justice WHITE's opinion, and
circulate the concurring paragraph suggested above.
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85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick
What

would

you

think

of

adding

a

footnote

It was conceded at oral argument that,

prior to

substantially as follows:

the

complaint

against

respondents,

there

had

been

no

prosecution since 19___ under Georgia's statute for sodomy
committed

in

private

since.

Moreover,

the

complaint

against respondents was dismissed by the State, and this
is

a

suit

respondents
statute.

a

declaratory

challenging

In reality,

controversy,
advisory

for

and

enforcement

suggests

validity

of

brought
this

by

ancient

one could say there is no case or

that

opinion.

the

judgment

we

At
the

are

being

least,

asked

the

moribund

to

history
character

render
of
today

an

nonof

ancient laws criminalizing this type of private conduct.
Some

states have repealed similar statutes.

constitutional validity of the Georgia
issue by respondents,

and

for

But the

statute was put in

the reasons stated by the

2.

Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of
years has now become a fundamental right.

L.F.P., Jr.
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is no
fundamental right - i.e. no substantive right under the
Due Process Clause - such as that claimed by respondent,
and found to exist by the Court of Appeals.

This is not

to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected
by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.

The Georgia

statute at issue in this case authorizes a court to
imprison one for up to 20 years for a single private act
of sodomy.

In my view, a prison sentence for such conduct

- certainly a sentence of long duration - would create a
serious Eighth Amendment issue.

Under the Georgia statute

a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a

'.·

2.

home, is a felony comparable in terms of the possible
sentence imposed for serious felonies such as ------and -------

{Here, Mike, perhaps a footnote also

could be added based on the library's providing detailed
information as to felony statutes in other states for
sodomy) •
In this case, however, respondent has not been
tried, much less convicted and sentenced.

Moreover, as

respondent has not raised an Eighth Amendment issue, this
constitutional argument is not before us.

The

applicability of the Eighth Amendment to cases such as
this arises only when a prison sentence is imposed.

* * *
Mike, possibly add a footnote generally to effect
that a serious question considered by the legislative

3.

bodies of other states is whether other than centuries of
history, there is a present day justification for making
an act of sodomy a felony in the same general category as
major crimes against persons and property.

There is, of

course, a substantial if not a compelling state interest
in assuring the continued existence over the centuries
ahead of the human race.

Sodomy, a form of sexual

gratification unrelated to family and children, may not
have any redeeming societal purpose.

But whatever may be

said in this respect, a serious question exists, apart
from constitutionality, whether statutes that criminalize
acts of sodomy that rarely are or can be enforced, serve
any purpose.

~lfp/ss 06/13/86

WICK SALLY-POW
85-140 Bowers v. Hardwick

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is no
fundamental right - i.e. no substantive right under the
Due Process Clause - such as that claimed by respondent,
and found to exist by the Court of Appeals.

This is not

to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected
by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.

The Georgia

statute at issue in this case, Ga. Code Ann. §16-6-2,
authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years
for a single private, consensual act of sodomy.

In my

view, a prison sentence for such conduct - certainly a
sentence of long duration - would create a serious Eighth
Amendment issue.

Under the Georgia statute a single act

2.

of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence
imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery,
§16-5-24, first degree arson, §16-7-60 and robbery, §16-840.1
In this case, however, respondent has not been
tried, much less convicted and sentenced.

Moreover, as

respondent has not raised an Eighth Amendment issue, this

lAmong those states that continue to make sodomy a crime,
Georgia authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See
Ala. Code §13A-6-65 (a) (3) (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§13-1411, 131412 (1978); Ark. Stat. §41-1813 (1975); D.C. Code §22-3052
(1981); Fla. Stat. §800.02 (1984); Ga. Code §16-6-2 (1982); Idaho
Code §18-6605 (1979); Kan. Stat. §21-3505 (1974); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§510.100 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. §§14:89.1 (1982); Md. Code art.
27, §§553-54 (Supp. 1982); Mich. Comp. Laws §§750.158, 750.338,
750.388(a)-(b) (1981); Minn. Stat. §609.293 (Supp. 1982); Miss.
Code §97-29-59 (1972); Mo. Stat. §566.090 (Vernon 1982); Mont.
Code §45-5-505 (1981); Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.190 (1979); N.C. Gen.
Stat . § 14 -17 7 ( 19 81) ; 0 k 1 a . Stat . tit. 21 , § 8 8 6 ( 19 8 3 ) ; R. I. Gen.
Laws §11-10-1 (1981); S.C. Code §16-15-120 (1977); Tenn. Code
§39-2-612 (1982); Tex. Penal Code §21.06 (Vernon 1974); Utah Code
§76-5-403 (1983); Va. Code §18.2-361 (1982).

3.

constitutional argument is not before us.

The

applicability of the Eighth Amendment to cases such as
this arises only when a sentence is imposed.
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The dissent relies on the plurality opinion that

) I/- 'JJ U-_ .1 v 'Iff. (} 1 ..,
I wrote in Moore v. East Cleveland to reason that the

7)

J

1

Court today closes its eyes "to the basic reasons why
certain rights associated with the family have been
accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause."

Id. , at,...50 1:

I find it more than a

little curious to cite, much less analogize, Moore's focus
on the importance of the "family" to the conduct of sodomy
in private.

The fundamental reason for the condemnation

of sodomy has been its antithesis to family.

The

preservation of civilization depends upon the family and
the bearing of children •

.

.

.
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Justice Brennan
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No. 85-140
MICHAEL J . BOWERS, A'ITORNEY GENERAL OF
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK,
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE
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APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental righti. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clausesuch as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this case,
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conductcertainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24,
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1
' Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code
§13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-1813
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code§ 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Fla. Stat. §800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to
20 years); Idaho Code §18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. §510.100
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In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us.

(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp.
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum),
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year maximum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum).
2
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades.
See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). Moreover,
the State has declined to present the criminal proceeding to a grand jury,
and this is a suit for declaratory judgment brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states have repealed similar statutes.
But the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in issue by
respondents, and for the reasons stated by the Court, I cannot say that
conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental
right.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK,
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE
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[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental righti. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clausesuch as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in ·t his case,
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conductcertainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24,
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1
'Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100

85-140--CONCUR

2

BOWERS v. HARDWICK

In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us.

(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp.
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum),
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21 , § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year maximum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum).
2
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several dec- l
ades. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939).
Moreover, the State has declined to present the criminal charge against I
Hardwick to a grand jury, and this is a suit for declaratory judgment
brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states
have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of the
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons
stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of
years has now become a fundamental right.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
This case is no more about "a fundamental right to engage
in homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare,
ante, at 4, than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), was
about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz
v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967) , was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth.
Rather, this case is about "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men," namely, "the
right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J ., dissenting).
The statute at issue, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, denies individuals the right to decide for themselves whether to engage
in particular forms of private, consensual sexual activity.
The Court concludes that§ 16-6-2 is valid essentially because
"the laws of ... many States ... still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time." Ante, at 3. But
the fact that the moral judgments expressed by statutes like
§ 16-6-2 may be "natural and familiar ... ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 117 (1973), quoting
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes , J. ,
dissenting). Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[i]t is re-
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volting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897). I believe we must analyze
respondent's claim in the light of the values that underlie the
constitutional right to privacy. If that right means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens
for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their
lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have
made is an "'abominable crime not fit to be named among
Christians."' Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721, 46 S. E.
876, 882 (1904).
I
In its haste to reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that
the Constitution does not "confe[r] a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy," ante, at 3, the Court
relegates the actual statute being challenged to a footnote
and ignores the procedural posture of the case before it. A
fair reading of the statute and of the complaint clearly reveals
that the majority has distorted the question this case
presents.
First, the Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual
activity is particularly hard to justify in light of the broad
language Georgia has used. Unlike the Court, the Georgia
Legislature has not proceeded on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives
may be controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it
limited the choices of those other citizens. Cf. ante, at 2,
n. 2. Rather, Georgia has provided that "[a] person commits
the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2(a).
The sex or status of the persons who engage in the act is
irrelevant as a matter of state law. In fact, to the extent I
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can discern a legislative purpose for Georgia's 1968 enactment of§ 16-6-2, that purpose seems to have been to broaden
the coverage of the law to reach heterosexual as well as homosexual activity. 1 I therefore see no basis for the Court's
decision to treat this case as an "as applied" challenge to
§ 16-6-2, see ante, at 2, n. 2, or for Georgia's attempt, both in
its brief and at oral argument, to defend § 16-6-2 solely on
the grounds that it prohibits homosexual activity. Michael
Hardwick's standing may rest in significant part on Georgia's
apparent willingness to enforce against homosexuals a law it
seems not to have any desire to enforce against heterosexuals. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5; cf. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760
F. 2d 1202, 1205-1206 (CAll 1985). But his claim that
§ 16-6-2 involves an unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right of intimate association does not depend in
any way on his sexual orientation.
Second, I disagree with the Court's refusal to consider
whether § 16-6-2 runs afoul of the Eighth or Ninth Amendments or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ante, at 9, n. 8. Respondent's complaint expressly invoked the Ninth Amendment, see App. 6, and he
relied heavily before this Court on Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965), which identifies that Amendment
as one of the specific constitutional provisions giving "life and
substance" to our understanding of privacy. See Brief for
Respondent 10-12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. More importantly,
the procedural posture of the case requires that we affirm the
'Until1968, Georgia defined sodomy as "the carnal knowledge and connection against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the same unnatural manner with woman." Ga. Crim. Code § 26-5901 (1933). In
Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939), the Georgia
Supreme Court held that§ 26-5901 did not prohibit lesbian activity. And
in Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 133 S. E. 2d 367 (1963), the Georgia
Supreme Court held that § 26-5901 did not prohibit heterosexual cunnilingus. Georgia passed the act-specific statute currently in force "perhaps in
response to the restrictive court decisions such as Riley," Note, The
Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. Pub. L. 159, 167, n. 47 (1967).
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Court of Appeals' judgment if there is any ground on which
respondent may be entitled to relief. This case is before us
on petitioner's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). See App. 17. It is a well settled principle of law that "a complaint should not be dismissed
merely because a plaintiff's allegations do not support the
particular legal theory he advances, for the court is under a
duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations
provide for relief on any possible theory." Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F. 2d 714, 716 (CAB 1974); see Parr v. Great Lakes
Express Co., 484 F. 2d 767, 773 (CA71973); Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F. 2d 630, 631 (CA5 1964); United
States v. Howell, 318 F. 2d 162, 166 (CA9 1963); 5 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1357,
pp. 601-602 (1969); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41,
45-46 (1957). Thus, even if respondent did not advance
claims based on the Eighth or Ninth Amendments, or on the
Equal Protection Clause, his complaint should not be dismissed if any of those provisions could entitle him to relief. I
need not reach either the Eighth Amendment or the Equal
Protection Clause issues because I believe that Hardwick has
stated a cognizable claim that § 16-6-2 interferes with constitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of
intimate association. But neither the Eighth Amendment
nor the Equal Protection Clause is so clearly irrelevant that a
claim resting on either provision should be peremptorily dismissed. 2 The Court's cramped reading of the issue before it
2
In Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962), the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment barred convicting a defendant due to his "status"
as a narcotics addict, since that condition was "apparently an illness which
may be contracted innocently or involuntarily." ld., at 667. In Powell v.
Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968), where the Court refused to extend Robinson
to punishment of public drunkenness by a chronic alcoholic, one of the factors relied on by JUSTICE MARSHALL, in writing the plurality opinion, was
that Texas had not "attempted to regulate appellant's behavior in the privacy of his own home." Id., at 532. JUSTICE WHITE wrote separately:
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makes for a short opinion, but it does little to make for a persuasive one.
II
"Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual
"Analysis of this difficult case is not advanced by preoccupation with the
label 'condition.' In Robinson the Court dealt with 'a statute which makes
the "status" of narcotic addition a criminal offense ... .' 370 U. S., at
666. By precluding criminal conviction for such a 'status' the Court was
dealing with a condition brought about by acts remote in time from the
application of the criminal sanctions contemplated, a condition which was
relatively permanent in duration, and a condition of great magnitude and
significance in terms of human behavior and values. . . . If it were necessary to distinguish between 'acts' and 'conditions' for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment, I would adhere to the concept of 'condition' implicit in
the opinion in Robinson . . . . The proper subject of inquiry is whether
volitional acts brought about the 'condition' and whether those acts are sufficiently proximate to the 'condition' for it to be permissible to impose penal
sanctions on the 'condition.'" !d., at 550-551, n. 2.
Despite historical views of homosexuality, it is no longer viewed by mental health professionals as a "disease" or disorder. See Brief for American
Psychological Association and American Public Health Association as
Amici Curiae 8-11. But, obviously, neither is it simply a matter of deliberate personal election. Homosexual orientation may well form part of
the very fiber of an individual's personality. Consequently, under JusTICE WHITE's analysis in Powell, the Eighth Amendment may pose a constitutional barrier to sending an individual to prison for acting on that attraction regardless of the circumstances. An individual's ability to make
constitutionally protected "decisions concerning sexual relations," Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 711 (1977) (POWELL, J. ,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), is rendered empty indeed if he or she is given no real choice but a life without any physical
intimacy.
With respect to the Equal Protection Clause's applicability to § 16-6-2, I
note that Georgia's exclusive stress before this Court on its interest in
prosecuting homosexual activity despite the gender-neutral terms of the
statute may raise serious questions of discriminatory enforcement, questions that cannot be disposed of before this Court on a motion to dismiss.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373-374 (1886). The legislature
having decided that the sex of the participants is irrelevant to the legality
of the acts, I do not see why the State can defend § 16-6-2 on the ground
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liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government."
Thornburgh v. American Call. of Obst. & Gyn., - - U. S.
- - , - - (1986) (slip op. 23). In construing the right to privacy, the Court has proceeded along two somewhat distinct,
albeit complementary, lines. First, it has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are
properly for the individual to make. E. g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U. S. 113 (1973); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925). Second, it has recognized a privacy interest with
reference to certain places without regard for the particular
activities in which the individuals who occupy them are engaged. E. g., United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705 (1984);
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980); Rios v. United
States, 364 U. S. 253 (1960). The case before us implicates
both the decisional and the spatial aspects of the right to
privacy.
A
The Court concludes today that none of our prior cases
dealing with various decisions that individuals are entitled to
make free of governmental interference "bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case."
Ante, at 4. While it is true that these cases may be characterized by their connection to protection of the family, see
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 619 (1984),
the Court's conclusion that they extend no further than this
boundary ignores the warning in Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U. S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion), against "closthat individuals singled out for prosecution are of the same sex as their
partners. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause may well be available without having to reach the
more controversial question whether homosexuals are a suspect class.
See, e. g., Rowland v. Mad River Local School District,- U. S. - ,
(1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Note, The
Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285 (1985).
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[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the ~ have been accorded shelter under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." We protect
those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and
material way, to the general public welfare, but because they
form so cent ala pa
an · div·
' life. "[T]he concept
of privacy em odies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to
himself and not others nor to society as a whole.'" Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., - - U. S., at
- - , n. 5 (STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op. 6, n. 5), quoting
Fried, Correspondence, 6 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 288-289
(1977). And so we protect the decision whether to marry
precisely because marriage "is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 486. We protect the
decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters so
dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of
demographic considerations or the Bible's command to be
fruitful and multiply. Cf. Thornburgh v. American Coll. of
Obst. & Gyn., supra, at--, n. 6 (STEVENS, J., concurring)
(slip op. 6, n. 6). And we pr_otect the family because it
contributes so powerfully to the liappiness of individuals, not
because of a preference for stereotypical households. Cf.
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S., at 500-506 (plurality
OprrUon). The Court recognized in Roberts, 468 U. S., at
619, that the "ability independently to define one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the "emotional enrichment of close ties with others." Ibid.
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that
sexual intimacy is "a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the
development of human personality," Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slayton, 413 U. S. 49, 63 (1973); see also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 685 (1977). The
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fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many
"right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much
of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom
an individual has to choose the form and nature of these
intensely personal bonds. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L. J. 624, 637 (1980); cf.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Roe v. Wade,
410 U. 8., at 153.
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a
necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose
how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in
holding that the clearly important state interest in public
education should give way to a competing claim by the Amish
to the effect that extended formal schooling threatened their
way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no assumption
that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like
them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic
but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be
condemned because it is different." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U. S. 205, 223-224 (1972). The Court claims that its decision
today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals
have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations
with others.
B
The behavior for which Hardwick faces prosecution occurred in his own home, a place to which the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance. The Court's treatment of
this aspect of the case is symptomatic of its overall refusal to
consider the broad principles that have informed our treatment of privacy in specific cases. Just as the right to privacy
is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitle-
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ments to engage in specific behavior, so too, protecting the
physical integrity of the home is more than merely a means of
protecting specific activities that often take place there.
Even when our understanding of the contours of the right to
privacy depends on "reference to a 'place,"' Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S., at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), "the essence of a Fourth Amendment violation is 'not the breaking
of [a person's] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,' but
rather is 'the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property."' California
v. Ciraolo, - - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (POWELL, J., dissenting) (slip op. 11), quoting Boyd v. United States, 116
u. s. 616, 630 (1886).
The Court's interpretation of the pivotal case of Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), is entirely unconvincing.
Stanley held that Georgia's undoubted power to punish the
public distribution of constitutionally unprotected, obscene
material did not permit the State to punish the private possession of such material. According to the majority here,
Stanley relied entirely on the First Amendment, and thus, it
is claimed, sheds no light on cases not involving printed
materials. Ante, at 8. But that is not what Stanley said.
Rather, the Stanley Court anchored its holding in the Fourth
Amendment's special protection for the individual in his
home:
"'The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to
be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.'
"These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the
case before us. He is asserting the right to read or ob-
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serve what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own
home." Id., at 564-565, quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U. S., at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The central place that Stanley gives Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, a case raising no First Amendment claim,
shows that Stanley rested as much on the Court's understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it did on the First.
Indeed, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49
(1973), the Court suggested that reliance on the Fourth
Amendment not only supported the Court's outcome in Stanley but actually was necessary to it: "If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in itself carried with it a
'penumbra' of constitutionally protected privacy, this Court
would not have found it necessary to decide Stanley on the
narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home,' which was hardly
more than a reaffirmation that 'a man's home is his castle.'"
I d., at 66. "The right of the people to be secure in their ...
houses," expressly guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, is
perhaps the most "textual" of the various constitutional provisions that inform our understanding of the right to privacy,
and thus I cannot agree with the Court's statement that
"[t]he right pressed upon us here has no ... support in the
text of the Constitution," ante, at 8. Indeed, the right of an
individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of
his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy.

III
The Court's failure to comprehend the magnitude of the
liberty interests at stake in this case leads it to slight the
question whether petitioner, on behalf of the State, has justified Georgia's infringement on these interests. I believe
that neither of the two general justifications for§ 16-6-2 that
petitioner has advanced warrants dismissing respondent's
challenge for failure to state a claim.
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First, petitioner asserts that the acts made criminal by the
statute may have serious adverse consequences for "the general public health and welfare," such as spreading communicable diseases or fostering other criminal activity. Brief for
Petitioner 37. Inasmuch as this case was dismissed by the
District Court on the pleadings, it is not surprising that the
record before us is barren of any evidence to support petitioner's claim. 3 In light of the state of the record, I see no
justification for the . Court's attempt to equate the private,
consensual sexual activity at issue here with the "possession
in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods," ante, at 9, to
which Stanley refused to extend its protection. 394 U. S.,
at 568, n. 11. None of the behavior so mentioned in Stanley
can properly be viewed as "[v]ictimless," ante, at 9: drugs
and weapons are inherently dangerous, see, e. g.,
McLaughlin v. United States,-- U. S. - - (1986), and for
property to be "stolen," someone must have been wrongfully
deprived of it. Nothing in the record before the Court provides any justification for finding the activity forbidden by
§ 16-6-2 to be physically dangerous, either to the persons engaged in it or to others. 4
Even if a court faced with a challenge to § 16-6-2 were to apply simple
rational-basis scrutiny to the statute, Georgia would be required to show
an actual connection between the forbidden acts and the ill effects it seeks
to prevent. The connection between the acts prohibited by § 16-6-2 and
the harms identified by petitioner in his brief before this Court is a subject
of hot dispute, hardly amenable to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Compare, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 36-37 and Brief
for David Robinson, Jr., as Amicus Curiae 23-28, on the one hand, with
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y. 2d 476, 489, 415 N. E. 2d 936, 941 (1980); Brief
for the Attorney General of the State of New York, joined by the Attorney
General of the State of California, as Amici Curiae 11-14; and Brief for the
American Psychological Association and American Public Health Association as Amici Curiae 19-27, on the other.
'Although I do not think it necessary to decide today issues that are not
even remotely before us, it does seem to me that a court could find simple,
analytically sound distinctions between certain private, consensual sexual
conduct, on the one hand, and adultery and incest (the only two vaguely
3

'

.
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The core of petitioner's defense of § 16-6-2, however, is
that respondent and others who engage in the conduct prohibited by § 16-6-2 interfere with Georgia's exercise of the
"'right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent
society,'" Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S., at
59-60, quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184, 199 (1964)
(Warren, C. J., dissenting). Essentially, petitioner argues,
and the Court agrees, that the fact that the acts described in
§ 16-6-2 "for hundreds of years, if not thousands, have been
uniformly condemned as immoral" is a sufficient reason to
permit a State to ban them today. Brief for Petitioner 19;
see ante, at 3, 5-8, 9.
I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has
held its convictions or the passions with which it defends
them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scrutiny.
See, e. g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U. S. 483 (1954). 5 As Justice Jackson wrote so eloquently
specific "sexual crimes" to which the majority points, ante, at 9), on the
other. For example, marriage, in addition to its spiritual aspects, is a civil
contract that entitles the contracting parties to a variety of governmentally
provided benefits. A State might define the contractual commitment necessary to become eligible for these benefits to include a commitment of fidelity and then punish individuals for breaching that contract. Moreover,
a State might conclude that adultery is likely to injure third persons, in
particular, spouses and children of persons who engage in extramarital affairs. With respect to incest, a court might well agree with respondent
that the nature of familial relationships renders true consent to incestuous
activity sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such activity
is warranted. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22. Notably, the Court makes no
effort to explain why it has chosen to group private, consensual homosexual activity with adultery and incest rather than with private, consensual
heterosexual activity by unmarried persons or, indeed, with oral or anal
sex within marriage.
' The parallel between Loving and this case is almost uncanny. There,
too, the State relied on a religious justification for its law. Compare 388
U. S., at 3 (quoting trial court's statement that "Almighty God created the
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate
continents. . . . The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not
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for the Court in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 641-642 (1943), "we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will
disintegrate the social organization. . . . [F]reedom to differ
is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would
be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." See also Karst, 89 Yale L. J. , at 627. It is
precisely because the issue raised by this case touches the
heart of what makes individuals what they are that we should
be especially sensitive to the rights of those whose choices
upset the majority.
The assertion that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe" the conduct involved, Brief for Petitioner 20, cannot
provide an adequate justification for § 16-6-2. That certain,
but by no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior
at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments
on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation
depends instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious docintend for the races to mix"), with Brief for Petitioner 20-21 (relying on the
Old and New Testaments and the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas to show
that "traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe such conduct"). There,
too, defenders of the challenged statute relied heavily on the fact that when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified , most of the States had similar
prohibitions. Compare Brief for Appellee in Loving v. Virginia, 0. T.
1966, No. 395, pp. 28-29, with ante, at 5-7 and n. 6. There, too, at the
time the case came before the Court, many of the States still had criminal
statutes concerning the conduct at issue. Compare 388 U. S. , at 6, n. 5
(noting that 16 States still outlawed interracial marriage), with ante, 6-7
(noting that 24 States and the District of Columbia have sodomy statutes).
Yet the Court held, not only that the individious racism of Virginia's law
violated the Equal Protection Clause, see 388 U. S. , at 7-12, but also that
the law deprived the Lovings of due process by denying them the "freedom
of choice to marry" that had "long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. "
Id. , at 12.
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trine. See, e. g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420,
429-453 (1961); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980). Thus,
far from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status during the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion
that § 16-6-2 represents a legitimate use of secular coercive
power. 6 A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior
because of racial animus. "The Constitution cannot control
such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be 'outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly give them effect." Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 433 (1984). No matter how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we
have held that "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot
constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 575 (1975).
See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, - U. S. - - (1985); U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413

u. s. 528, 534 (1973).

Nor can § 16-6-2 be justified as a "morally neutral" exercise of Georgia's power to "protect the public environment,"
Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U. S., at 68-69. Certainly, some
•The theological nature of the origin of Anglo-American antisodomy
statutes is patent. It was not until 1533 that sodomy was made a secular
offense in England. 25 Hen. VIII, cap. 6. Until that time, the offense
was, in Sir James Stephen's words, "merely ecclesiastical." 2 J . Stephen,
A History of the Criminal Law of England 430 (1883). Pollock and Maitland similarly observed that "[t]he crime against nature . . . . was so
closely connected with heresy that the vulgar had but one name for both."
2 F . Pollock & F . Maitland, The History of English Law 554 (1895). The
transfer of jurisdiction over prosecutions for sodomy to the secular courts
seems primarily due to the alteration of ecclesiastical jurisdiction attendant
on England's break with the Roman Catholic Church, rather than to any
new understanding of the sovereign's interest in preventing or punishing
the behavior involved. Cf. E. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of
the Laws of England, ch. 10 (4th ed. 1797).
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private behavior can affect the fabric of society as a whole.
Reasonable people may differ about whether particular sexual acts are moral or immoral, but "we have ample evidence
for believing that people will not abandon morality, will not
think any better of murder, cruelty and dishonesty, merely
because some private sexual practice which they abominate is
not punished by the law." H. L. A. Hart, Immorality and
Treason; reprinted in The Law as Literature 220, 225 (L.
Blom-Cooper ed. 1961). Petitioner and the Court fail to see
the difference between laws that protect public sensibilities
and those that enforce private morality. Statutes banning
public sexual activity are entirely consistent with protecting
the individual's liberty interest in decisions concerning sexual
relations: the same recognition that those decisions are intensely private which justifies protecting them from governmental interference can justify protecting individuals from
unwilling exposure to the sexual activities of others. But
the mere fact that intimate behavior may be punished when it
takes place in public cannot dictate how States can regulate
intimate behavior that occurs in intimate places. See Paris
Adult Theatre I, supra, at 66, n. 13 ("marital intercourse on a
street corner or a theater stage" can be forbidden despite the
constitutional protection identified in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 7
7
At oral argument a suggestion appeared that, while the Fourth
Amendment's special protection of the home might prevent the State from
enforcing § 16-6-2 against individuals who engage in consensual sexual activity there, that protection would not make the statute invalid. See Tr.
of Oral Arg. 10-11. The suggestion misses the point entirely. If the law
is not invalid, then the police can invade the home to enforce it, provided,
of course, that they obtain a determination of probable cause from a neutral
magistrate. One of the reasons for the Court's holding in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), was precisely the possibility, and repugnancy, of permitting searches to obtain evidence regarding the use of contraceptives. I d., at 485-486. Permitting the kinds of searches that might
be necessary to obtain evidence of the sexual activity banned by § 16-6-2
seems no less intrusive, or repugnant. Cf. Winston v. Lee, - - U. S.
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This case involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not
adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable
interest, cf. Diamond v. Charles, - - U.S. - - , - (1986) (slip op. 10-11), let alone an interest that can justify
invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose
to live their lives differently.
IV
It took but three years for the Court to see the error in its
analysis in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S.
586 (1940), and to recognize that the threat to national cohesion posed by a refusal to salute the flag was vastly outweighed by the threat to those same values posed by compelling such a salute. See West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). I can only hope that here,
too, the Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude
that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our
Nation's history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever
do. Because I think the Court today betrays those values, I
dissent.

(1985); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F. 2d 1263, 1274 (CA7
1983).
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HARD SALLY-POW

The dissent, in finding a
right to engage in private sodomy, relies on my plurality
opinion in Moore v. East Cleveland, 431

u.s.,

494 (1977).

In that case, the plurality found that our decisions
"establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institutions of the
family are deeply rooted in this nation's history and
tradition." Id., at 503.
I find it more than a little curious to cite,
much less analogize, Moore's focus on the "sanctity of the
family" with sodomy.

Nor can it be contended that the

practice of sodomy is "deeply rooted in our history and

2.

tradition".

Indeed, the reason for the condemnation of

sodomy has been its antithesis to family.

To: The Chief Ju ~ tlce
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
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MICHAEL J. BOWERS, A'ITORNEY GENERAL OF
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK,
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE
• ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental righti. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clausesuch as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this case,
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conductcertainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24,
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1
'Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100

_ _ _
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In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us.

(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp.
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum),
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year maximum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum).
2
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades.
See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939). Moreover,
the State has declined to present the criminal proceeding to a grand jury,
and this is a suit for declaratory judgment brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states have repealed similar statutes.
But the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute was put in issue by
respondents, and for the reasons stated by the Court, I cannot say that
conduct condemned for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental
right.
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MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I agree with the Court that there is no fundamental righti. e., no substantive right under the Due Process Clausesuch as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the
Court of Appeals. This is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution. The Georgia statute at issue in this case,
Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2, authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for a single private, consensual act of
sodomy. In my view, a prison sentence for such conductcertainly a sentence of long duration-would create a serious
Eighth Amendment issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy, even in the private setting of a home, is a
felony comparable in terms of the possible sentence imposed
to serious felonies such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24,
first degree arson, § 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1
Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100
1
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BOWERS v. HARDWICK

In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us.

(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp.
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum),
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984) (1year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985) (6year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code§ 16-15-120 (1985) (5-year maximum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2- 361 (1982) (5-year maximum).
2
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several dec- l
ades. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939).
Moreover, the State has declined to present the criminal charge against I
Hardwick to a grand jury, and this is a suit for declaratory judgment
brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states
have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of the
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons
stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of
years has now become a fundamental right.
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No. 85-140

MICHAEL J. BOWERS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
GEORGIA, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL HARDWICK,
AND JOHN AND MARY DOE
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June-, 1986]

JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I agree with the Court
that there is no fundamental right-i. e., no substantive right
under the Due Process Clause-such as that claimed by respondent, and found to exist by the Court of Appeals. This
is not to suggest, however, that respondent may not be protected by the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. The
Georgia statute at issue in this case, Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-2,
authorizes a court to imprison a person for up to 20 years for
a single private, consensual act of sodomy. In my view, a
prison sentence for such conduct-certainly a sentence of
long duration-would create a serious Eighth Amendment
issue. Under the Georgia statute a single act of sodomy,
even in the private setting of a home, is a felony comparable
in terms of the possible sentence imposed to serious felonies
such as aggravated battery, § 16-5-24, first degree arson,
§ 16-7-60 and robbery, § 16-8-40. 1
1
Among those States that continue to make sodomy a crime, Georgia
authorizes one of the longest possible sentences. See Ala. Code
§ 13A-6-65(a)(3) (1982) (1-year maximum); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West Supp. 1985) (30 days); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1813
(1977) (1-year maximum); D. C. Code § 22-3502 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Fla. Stat. § 800.02 (1985) (60-day maximum); Ga. Code§ 16-6-2 (1984) (1 to
20 years); Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1979) (5-year minimum); Kan. Stat. Ann.
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BOWERS v. HARDWICK

In this case, however, respondent has not been tried, much
less convicted and sentenced. 2 Moreover, respondent has
not raised the Eighth Amendment issue below. For these
reasons this constitutional argument is not before us.

§ 21-3505 (Supp. 1985) (6-month maximum); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.100
(1985) (90 days to 12 months); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:89 (West Supp.
1986) (5-year maximum); Md. Code Art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1982) (10-year
maximum); Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.158 (15-year maximum),
750.388(a)-(b) (1968) (5-year maximum); Minn. Stat. § 609.293 (1984)
(1-year maximum); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1973) (10-year maximum);
Mo. Rev. Stat . .§ 566.090 (1978) (1-year maximum); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 45-5-505 (1985) (10-year maximum); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.190 (1985)
(6-year maximum); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-177 (1981) (10-year maximum);
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21, § 886 (1983) (10-year maximum); R. I. Gen. Laws
§ 11-10-1 (1981) (7 to 20 years); S. C. Code § 16-15- 120 (1985) (5-year
maximum); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-612 (1982) (5 to 15 years); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 21.06 (1974) ($200 maximum fine); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403
(1983) (6-month maximum); Va. Code§ 18.2-361 (1982) (5-year maximum).
2
It was conceded at oral argument that, prior to the complaint against
respondent Hardwick, there had been no reported decision involving prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under this statute for several decades. See Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S. E. 799 (1939).
Moreover, the State has declined to present the criminal charge against
Hardwick to a grand jury, and this is a suit for declaratory judgment
brought by respondents challenging the validity of the statute. The history of nonenforcement suggests the moribund character today of laws
criminalizing this type of private, consensual conduct. Some 26 states
have repealed similar statutes. But the constitutional validity of the
Georgia statute was put in issue by respondents, and for the reasons
stated by the Court, I cannot say that conduct condemned for hundreds of
years has now become a fundamental right.
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THE BURGER COURT
The retirement of Chief Justice Burger has prompted the
media and legal scholars to look back on the 17 years he
served as Chief, and to make comparisons with the years of
Earl Warren's tenure as Chief Justice. I have served for
14Y:! of the Burger Court years. P~rhaps my view of the two
Courts may be of interest. In a luncheon talk, of course, I
can do little more than generalize and cite to a few of the
leading cases.
When describing judicial decisions, I do not like to use the
political labels "liberal" and "conservative." Apart from the
fact that a judge may take what is considered a liberal position on some areas of the law and a conservative one on others, I believe that most judges-Federal and State-try conscientiously to obey their oath of office, and to put behind
them partisan and social predilections. But it is a common
practice for Presidents to make their judicial appointments
based on their perception of the appointees' political views.
This practice was followed by the Presidents who appointed
members of the Burger Court.
President Nixon, sensing substantial public displeasure
with Warren Court decisions on criminal procedure, announced his intention to appoint conservatives. This also
was a goal of Presidents Ford and Reagan. These three Republican Presidents appointed six members of the Court over
which Warren Burger presided. But it is clear from the history of the Court, and certainly that of both the Warren and
Burger Courts, that Presidents frequently are disappointed
in the performance of their appointees. However one defines the term "conservative," there has been no conservative
counterrevolution by the Burger Court.
Criminal Procedure
Perhaps the highest expectation of the Presidents who
appointed the Burger Court majority was that their appointees would vote to overrule the criminal procedure decisions
of the Warren Court. The names of many of those decisions
are well known, among them Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643
(1961), Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), and,
of course, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).
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These were the doctrinal pillars of the Warren Court's
criminal procedure jurisprudence. The Burger Court overruled none of these decisions. Indeed, in recent years
Miranda has become a household term, though members of
the public probably use it with less than full understanding.
Perhaps you have heard the story of the woman whose son
was a professor of law and who occasionally commented to
him about the law. Mter Ernesto Miranda was killed in a
• game, the mother sent her son a
barroom brawl over a card
copy of the newspaper clipping concerning Miranda's death.
On the bottom she wrote: "Charles, after all he did for us,
isn't this a shame!" Whatever one's view of Miranda, the
decision has a symbolic quality that extends far beyond its
practical impact upon police interrogation methods.
It is fair to say that some decisions of the Burger Court
have limited Miranda. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S.
222 (1971), for example, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, the Court held that statements inadmissable in the
prosecution's case-in-chief because of defective Miranda
warnings nevertheless could be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if he chose to take the stand.
More recently, in New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649
(1984), the Court recognized a narrow public safety exception
to the Miranda rule. In that case, officers arrested a suspect in a crowded supermarket. When an officer noticed
that the suspect wore an empty shoulder holster, he asked
the suspect, without first giving Miranda warnings, where
he had hidden the gun. We held that the suspect's response
and the gun were admissible in evidence because the need to
protect the public safety outweighed the need for Miranda
warnings.
The Burger Court also was called upon to define the terms
used in the Miranda standard and thus to clarify the extent
of the protections the decision afforded. In Rhode Island v.
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Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980), for example, the Court defined
the meaning of "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda,
holding that warnings are required "whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Id., at 300-301.
While that legal definition appears fairly generous, the Court went on to apply
it cautiously, concluding that the respondent in Innis had
not been "interrogated." Similarly, the Burger Court provided a test for deciding when a suspect is "in custody" for
Miranda purposes. See, e. g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U. S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), the Burger
Court expanded the protections afforded by Miranda.
Under the Edwards rule, whenever a suspect invokes his
Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, the police are not free to resume questioning until counsel has been made available, unless the suspect
himself initiates further conversations with the police. 1
An important Sixth Amendment decision of the Warren
Court was Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964).
M assiah held that, once a suspect's Sixth Amendment rights
attach, police may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. This decision
had enormous practical implications for police investigation
techniques. The Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed
M assiah, making clear that the rule applies to surreptitious
interrogation methods. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S.
387 (1977); United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980);
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U. S. - - (1985). In Kuhlmann v.
Wilson,-- U. S.-- (1986), however, the Court did place
an outer limit on the Massiah rule, requiring a defendant to
'Just this term, the Court extended the rule in Edwards, holding that
its protection applies once a suspect invokes his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel during his arraignment. Michigan v. Jackson,- U.S. (1986).
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show that the police took some action, beyond merely listening, to elicit his incriminating remarks.
The Warren Court also is well known for its Fourth
Amendment decisions. One of the most famous of these,
M app v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), held that the exclusionary rule was applicable in state criminal trials. The Burger
Court has continued stringently to enforce the rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
But we have qualified some of the Warren Court's broad
statements concerning the scope of the remedy for violation
of Fourth Amendment rights.
Most importantly perhaps, the Burger Court rejected language in M app that suggested that use of illegally seized
evidence was itself a Fourth Amendment violation. We explained that the exclusionary rule was a "judicially created
means of effectuating" Fourth Amendment rights that rested
"principally on the belief that exclusion would deter future
unlawful police conduct." Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
482, 484 (1976). Based on that view of the exclusionary rule,
the Burger Court significantly modified the rule when, in
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897 (1984), we adopted the
so-called "good faith" exception.
The Burger Court inherited criminal procedure decisions
announcing broad principles protecting the rights of criminal
defendants. 2 In reviewing lower court decisions applying
1
Capital punishment jurisprudence was one area that was virtually undeveloped by the Warren Court, with that Court implicitly accepting the
view that imposition of the death penalty was consistent with the Constitution. Indeed, in an opinion written for himself and three other Justices,
Chief Justice Warren expressed the view that the death penalty could not
"be said to violate the constitutional concept of cruelty" because the penalty had been employed throughout our Nation's history and was still accepted by our society. Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 99 (1958). In 1972,
however, the Burger Court took the significant step of deciding that capital
punishment, as then implemented by the States, offended the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Furman v. ·
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). When States responded to Furman by re-
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those principles, the Court was repeatedly called upon to
define their terms and to clarify their scope. I think it
is fair to say that the record of the Burger Court in this area
reflects a higher sensitivity to the public interest in law enforcement than that reflected in some of the decisions of the
Warren Court. But in my view, we have not diminished
the constitutional protections afforded to those suspected of
committing crime. 3
enacting their death penalty statutes, the Court concluded that imposition
of capital punishment for the crime of murder was not a per se violation of
the Eighth Amendment and upheld those statutes that provided safeguards against arbitrary and capricious imposition of the penalty by guiding sentencing discretion. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976);
Proffit v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262
(1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976). In recent years, we have considered many
challenges to imposition of the death penalty, seeking to ensure that the
penalty is administered both consistently and fairly. E. g., Ake v. Oklahoma,- U.S.- (1985); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982); Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U. S. 430 (1980). The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that imposition of
the penalty is constitutional only if States scrupulously follow standards
that protect against its arbitrary imposition.
In two important capital
punishment cases decided this term, we concluded that the Eighth Amendment bars execution of a prisoner who is insane, Ford v. Wainwright,-U. S. - - (1986), but upheld the States' practice of excluding from the
jury that will decide guilt persons with scruples against the death penalty,
Lockhart v. McCree,- U.S.- (1986).
3
Habeas corpus jurisprudence is another area in which the Burger
Court inherited a legacy of broad decisions favoring the rights of criminal
defendants. The Burger Court clearly has narrowed some of those decisions. Fairly read, the Burger Court's decisions represent an effort to accommodate the States' interest in finality of criminal convictions, on which
many important aspects of a rational criminal justice system are founded,
with a prisoner's interest in relief from unjust incarceration. For example, in Stone v. Powell, supra, we removed Fourth Amendment claims
from the reach of the federal habeas statutes because of the costs imposed
on the administration of criminal justice by application of the exclusionary
rule on collateral review. We concluded that federal courts no longer
should accept habeas jurisdiction over search and seizure claims unless the
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Racial Discrimination

I move now to racial discrimination decisions. The differences, if any, between the Warren and Burger Courts in this
area resulted from the nature of the issues presented to the
two Courts. The great legacy of Earl Warren's Court was
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). Brown
was followed by Green v. School Board of New Kent County,
391 U. S. 430 (1968), which held that federal courts could,
in appropriate cases, order affirmative action to achieve
desegregated public schools.
The Burger Court has not retreated from these decisions.
Indeed, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1 (1971), a unanimous Burger Court ruled that
federal district courts had remedial authority to order busing
of school children where desegregation otherwise could not
be achieved. Brown, Green, and Swann involved de jure
segregation. Two years after Swann, we extended the principles recognized in the de jure context to a case involving de
facto segregation in the Denver, Colorado, school system.
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U. S.
189 (1973).
prisoner could show that the State had denied him a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), the
Burger Court disapproved the "sweeping language" used by the Warren
Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), concerning the availability of
federal habeas corpus to review a state prisoner's constitutional claim that
the state courts had refused to consider on the merits because of noncompliance with a contemporaneous objection rule. Sykes rejected the "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia in favor of a test requiring the prisoner to demonstrate "cause and prejudice." This term, we were asked to
reconsider Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1 (1963), another broad
Warren Court decision concerning habeas corpus. In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, - - U. S. - - (1986), a plurality of the Court agreed that a state
prisoner is not entitled to successive federal habeas corpus review of his
conviction unless he supplements his constitutional claim with a showing of
factual innocence.
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Perhaps the most difficult issues in this area arise in
"affirmative action" or "reverse discrimination" cases. The
Warren Court never confronted this issue. We squarely
faced it for the first time in Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). There, the University's
system for admission to its Medical School used a quota,
reserving 16 of 100 seats for minority students. The parties
conceded that the respondent Bakke, whose application for
admission was rejected, had better grades and test scores
than most of the minority students admitted. Since diversity of experience and background, including race, was desirable in the educational setting, we concluded that a university lawfully could consider race as a factor in its admissions
system. But we disapproved fixed quotas based on race
alone such as that used by the University in Bakke.
Two years after Bakke, we considered an affirmative
action program, expressly appro·ved by Congress, for choosing contractors for Federal work projects. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980). We upheld the plan, although there was no Court for the appropriate standard to be
used to assess the constitutionality of affirmative action.
This past Term, we decided three difficult affirmative
action cases. The first, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education,-- U. S.-- (1986), was brought by nonminority teachers to challenge their school board's layoff system,
under which nonminority teachers would be discharged while
minority teachers with less seniority would be retained.
The board sought to justify the system on the ground that it
alleviated the effects of societal discrimination by providing
role models for minority students. But there had been no
finding of prior employment discrimination on the part of
the school board. We therefore concluded that the racial
classification embodied in the layoff provision violated equal
protection.
In two cases involving discrimination by local unions,
we considered whether Title VII empowers federal courts to
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order race-conscious relief that benefits persons who were
not actual victims of discrimination. Sheet Metal Workers
v. EEOC, - - U. S. - - (1986); Firefighters v. Cleveland,
- - U. S. - - (1986). We concluded that such remedies,
including hiring goals, may be appropriate where an employer or a labor union "has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination," or where "necessary to dissipate the
lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, supra, at--.
Despite the careful consideration given these cases, we
have not yet agreed on a standard generally applicable in
affirmative action cases. It is difficult to identify such a
standard because these cases present a wide variety of circumstances, and raise issues under both the Equal Protection
Clause and civil rights statutes. It is to be hoped that the
day will soon come when race and ancestry are factors no
longer taken into account in either private or governmental
decision-making.
I mention one additional race discrimination case decided
this Term. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), the
Warren Court effectively permitted prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to strike prospective black jurors on account of their race. This term, in Batson v. Kentucky, - U. S. - - (1986), we overruled Swain and held that such a
use of peremptory challenges violates a black defendant's
right to equal protection. Now, where the prosecutor's action in striking blacks gives rise to an inference of discrimination, he must articulate a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for
his use of peremptory challenges. In this case, the Burger
Court went well beyond the Warren Court in expanding protections afforded to minorities in a criminal trial.

Sex Discrimination
Although it had few opportunities to consider the issue,
the Warren Court seemed almost uninterested in sex discrimination. For a century, the Supreme Court had refused
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to overturn the line that States traditionally drew between
the sexes, upholding statutes barring women from jury service and from certain occupations. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U. S. 57 (1961), the Warren Court reaffirmed that States
largely were free to exclude women from jury service.
By contrast, the Burger Court repeatedly has removed
barriers to equality among the sexes. While there have
been many important decisions in this area, I mention only a
few.
The earliest was Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), that
invalidated, under the Equal Protection Clause, an Idaho
statute that gave a mandatory preference to male applicants
for letters of adminstration of a decedent's estate. Although
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for a unanimous Court was
brief, it was recognized as a turning point in our equal protection jurisprudence.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), marked the
beginning of the Burger ·Court's efforts to decide what level
of equal protection scrutiny should be applied to legislative
classifications based on sex. A plurality argued that such
classifications should be held inherently suspect and subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. Four other Justices concurred in
the judgment, declining to adopt that view of the applicable
standard. But eight members of the Court agreed that the
Equal Protection Clause required that married women in the
armed services be provided fringe benefits identical to those
given to married men.
The Burger Court also effectively overruled the Warren
Court's holding that a state lawfully could exclude women
from jury service. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522
(1975), invalidated a Louisiana statute, similar to that upheld
by the Warren Court in Hoyt v. Florida, that excluded all
women from jury service except those who volunteered.
Taylor was premised on the Sixth Amendment's requirement
that juries in criminal trials be drawn from a fair crosssection of the community, rather than on the Equal Pro-
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tection Clause. But language in Justice White's opinion for
the Court rejected the notion that "all women should be exempt from jury service based solely on their sex and [their]
presumed role in the home." 419 U. S., at 535, n. 17.
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718
(1982), presented a reverse sex discrimination situation. In
an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that a statesupported professional nursing school could not lawfully
exclude men even though seven other state universities were
coeducational, with two of those seven schools providing the
very curriculum that the respondent sought to pursue. This
decision took the important step of clearly articulating a
standard applicable to gender-based classifications. The
Court held that a government attempting to support such a
classification has the heavy "burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification," that is
satisfied by showing that the "classification serves 'important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives."' 458 U. S., at 724 (citations omitted). 4
Finally, in a case decided this term, we held that allegations of "hostile environment" sexual harassment state an actionable sex discrimination claim under Title VII. M eritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,-- U.S.-- (1986). The Court
unanimously agreed on the result in this case.
4
Another line of equal protection cases decided by the Warren Court
involved challenges by individual voters to their States' reapportionment
statutes. E. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U. S. 533 (1964). The Burger Court repeatedly has reaffirmed the vitality of the principles announced there. E. g., Gaffney v. Cummings,
412 U. S. 735 (1973). This term, the Court extended this line of decisions,
squarely holding for the first time that a claim of partisan political gerrymandering is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. Davis v.
Bandemer,- U. S . - (1986). But there was no Court for the standard that should be used to assess the constitutionality of a reapportionment
law alleged to be an unlawful partisan gerrymander.
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Substantive Due Process

(

The most controversial decision of the Burger Court is Roe
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that invalidated on substantive due process grounds state laws that criminalized most
abortions. Roe v. Wade and its progeny recognize a right of
privacy, "founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty," that encompasses a woman's interest in
obtaining an abortion. See, e. g., Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462
U. S. 476 (1983). This right is not absolute, but is subject to
the States' interests in preserving maternal health or the life
of a viable fetus. Because of their emphasis on the liberty
and privacy interests of women, these decisions have been
viewed as rejecting a type of sex discrimination. This term
we reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,-- U. S. - - (1986).
A recent case tested the,limits of substantive due process.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,-- U.S.-- (1986), the Court declined to hold that substantive due process encompasses a
right to engage in homosexual sodomy. Statutes similar
to the Georgia law challenged in this case have been on
the books for hundreds of years. These laws, now moribund
and rarely enforced, still exist in about half of the states.
The case may not be as significant as press reports suggest.
The respondent had not been tried or convicted, and we had
no occasion to consider possible defenses, such as one based
on the Eighth Amendment, to an actual prosecution.

First Amendment
Although First Amendment partisans rarely seem satisfied, both the Warren and Burger Courts have been sensitive
to the First Amendment rights that are fundamental to our
democracy. Certainly, there has been no retreat by the
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Burger Court from the stringent enforcement of these important rights. 5
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, decided
by the Warren Court in 1964, conferred a broad cloak of
immunity upon the press. The Sullivan rule requires a public official to prove that defamatory statements relating to
his official conduct were made with "actual malice." The
Warren Court extended this rule to public figures in Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967).
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), a libel
suit brought against a media defendant by a private individual, the Burger Court defined the limits of the Sullivan rule.
Gertz held that Sullivan does not apply in suits brought by
private citizens seeking to recover actual damages for defamatory falsehoods. While some critics regarded Gertz as a
Indeed, the Burger Court was the first to rule that the First Amendment affords some protection to speech concerning a commercial transaction. Prior to the 1970's, the Court declined to hold that the First Amendment placed any restraint on governmental regulation of commercial
speech. E. g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). In a series
of decisions beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), the
Burger Court held that commercial speech is not wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. See Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U. S. 350 (1977). This term, in a case involving casino advertising, the
Court again reaffirmed that speech concerning commercial transactions is
entitled to First Amendment protection. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc.
v. Tourism Co.,-- U. S. - - (1986). But we concluded that a State's
interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens could support a decision to regulate commercial speech, as long as the restrictions advanced
that interest and were no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest.
The Burger Court also squarely rejected the view t_hat the First Amendment protects only speech by individuals. Rather, we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that speech by corporations and other associations is
entitled to First Amendment protection. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n ofN. Y ., 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Comm'n, - - U. S. - - (1986).
5
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retreat from Sullivan, the decision reflects the Court's continuing effort to accommodate the States' interest in
compensating for injury to reputation with First Amendment
freedoms.
Just this term, however, in a case involving a private plaintiff, the Court struck the balance in favor of the press.
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, - -_ U. S.
- - (1986), we reversed the common law presumption that
defamatory speech is false, and required a private plaintiff to
prove falsity. 6
The Burger Court also has decided a number of cases
presenting issues under the "religion clauses" of the First
Amendment. I believe it is fair to say that no prior Court
has been more zealous to assure separation of church and
state, and at the same time to protect the rights guaranteed
by the Free Exercise Clause. 7 Of course, our decisions in
• In another recent decision, we emphasized the important role of the
federal courts in safeguarding the precious freedoms of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. Under Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485 (1984), the Court held that
appellate judges must independently decide whether the evidence in the
record supports a trial court's finding of malice. We reaffirmed in Bose
that "[t]he requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law." 466
U. S., at 510.
1
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), a decision written by Chief
Justice Burger during the early years of the Burger Court, established the
"purpose, effect, and entanglement" test that remains the governing standard under the Establishment Clause. During the 1984 term, the Court applied that standard in three cases presenting challenges under the Establishment Clause. See Wallace v. Jaffree, - - U. S. - - (1985); Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball,-- U. S. - - (1985); Aguilar v. Felton,
- - U. S. - - (1985). Our decisions under the Free Exercise Clause
have reaffirmed the principle that the Clause absolutely prohibits governmental regulation of religious beliefs and that it substantially protects lawful conduct founded on religious belief. Where the government limits religious liberty, it must demonstrate that the limitation "'is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.'" Bob Jones University
v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 603 (1983) (quoting United States v. Lee,
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this area reflect the tensions inevitably created by the sometimes conflicting values embodied in the religion clauses.
Summary

The Burger Court decided well over 2,000 cases. The
Warren Court, over 15 years, decided several hundred fewer
cases. I cite these numbers to emphasize the high degree of
selectivity in my discussion this afternoon. Depending upon
the cases one chooses, and one's purpose or bias, either of
these courts can be cast in liberal or conservative, favorable
or unfavorable lights.
But some points seem indisputable. Perhaps to the disappointment of the Presidents who nominated members of the
Burger Court, there has been no "counter-revolution" by that
Court. None of the landmark decisions of the Warren Court
was overruled, and some were extended.
It has been fashionable for critics to say that the Burger
Court "lacked a sense of direction," appeared to "drift," or
lacked a coherent "policy." 8 To lawyers, and certainly to
Article III judges, these observations should make little
sense. The great strength of the Supreme Court is that we
have no "policy" or purpose other than "faithfully and impartially'' to discharge our duties "agreeably to the Constitution
and laws of the United States."9 This is our sworn duty.
As a New York Times editorial put it, "The ultimate glory of
this unique institution is that each member [appointed for
life] is master only of himself." New York Times, June 18,
1986.
It is well to remember that the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are expressed in general terms: the First, Fourth,
455 U. S. 252, 257-258 (1982)).
(1972).

See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205

This misconception of the role of the Supreme Court was strikingly
illustrated by a widely circulated news story. The Court was criticized
for giving "mixed signals" rather than providing "one guided ideology."
Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 13, 1986.
'28 U. S. C. §453 (oath taken by federal Justices and judges) .
8

.

'
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Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments all are open to, and
indeed require, interpretation. Inevitably and properly,
reasonable minds-trained in the same law schools-often
differ in interpreting these important provisions. Yet, the
long-term stability of our legal system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis. Commentators who expect radical
changes because of personnel changes on the Court seem to
overlook our fidelity to this doctrine.
If I may speak personally, I knew most of the Justices
on the Warren Court, and of course I am close to those on
the Burger Court with whom I serve. I have great respect
and admiration for the legal ability, devotion to duty, and integrity of each of them.
Although at age 64 I went on the Court with some reluctance, I am honored to serve on it. Under our remarkable
constitutional system, the Court has well discharged its
responsibility to safeguard the liberties of our people.
August 12, 1986
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Powell Changed

$1.25

te in Sodomy Case

Different Outcome Seen Likl}lf If Homosexual Had Been Prosecuted
By AI Kamen
Wuhinaton Post Staff Writer

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL JR.
• • • voted initially to overturn statute
ll.

1.1· •••

..

~ ~'-'

]!

ur justices, led by Harry A.
ckmun, voted to say that a contitutional right to privacy protects
homosexuals and that the state
would have to show important reasons to outlaw sodomy among consenting adults.
Though Powell did not agree
with the reasoning, he voiced sufficient distaste for the antisodomy
law that he agreed to provide the
udal fifth vote for an overall deision striking the Georgia statute.
Four other justices, led by Byron
R. White, said the Constitution does
not grant homosexuals a right to
such conduct, even in their homes.

Powell's vote was tentative. All
votes in conference are preliminary
and can be changed at any time up
to the formal announcement of the
decision by the court.
With a fifth vote, Blackmun could
have written a majority opinion that
would have had the effect of overturning antisodomy laws in 24
states and the District of Columbia.
Within several days of the conference, however, Powell sent a
brief memo to his fellow justices
saying that he was switching his
vote and would, given the "posture"
See POWELL, AS, CoL 4

Powell Cha:riged Vote in Sodoiny·-case ·
_ _ _PO_WB_L_L,_Pro_a_A_l_~.......,.\

t

court, Atlanta prosecutors did not 'that~ states had prohibited it until
press charges against Hardwick, 1961. Chief justice Warren E.
of this case, join White and the oth- who had been arrested after being Bur..ser )Uld justices William H.
ers to uphold the Georgia law.
·· c;aught in his bedroom in a se~ act . . Relinquist aiid'SaAdra Day O'ConSources were unable to pinpoint with another man.
nor also joined White,
why Powell changed his mind. They '' ... The sources said Powell would
Blackmun, joined by justices Witsaid a critical factor was that Mi- TOte to repeal antisodomy laws if he 1iam J, Brennan.Jr,, Thurgood Marchael Hardwick, a gay Atlanta bar- were a legislator. There have been shall and john Paul Stevens, ac.tender, had not been· prosecuted. JR"oscriptions against sodoni~ (r~ . cused ~e ~rity of an 4 obsessive
;lnstead, Hardwick, through -a civil the first days of recorded history. · focus .QD hom~xual - ~tivity," givlawsuit, was asking the court to de- The court virtually wbuld have to en that the Georgia sodomy law
clare-the law unconstitutional.
. cast these aside under Blackmun's covered heterosexual as well as hoPowell stayed with White, de- theory, Powell felt.
mosexcaal acts.
•
"The court's cramped teading of
spite a strident dissent circulated
In addi~on, Powell ~ long had
by a furious Blackmun·, and 'joined trouble With the notion that the the issue before it makes for a short
the majority opinion issued June 30. court _could substitute its views ~f opinion," Blackmun said, "'but it
Details of Powell's switch, pro- moraltty for those of elected offt- does little to make for a persuasive
vided by -informed sources, offer an cials. He wa~ reluctant to ~av~ the one."
unusual glimpse of the workings of court recogmze _more specta~ n~hts
. "It is revolting," he said, "to have
the Supreme Court. Though ather not spelled ou~ m the Constttutton, no better reason for a rule of law
' accounts of justices' changing their the sourc;s satd_.
than that so it was laid down at the
minds in key cases have been disPowells sw~tch cam~ ~f?re time of Henry IV. It is still more reclosed in the past, such information Blackmun had ~c~ated his op~on volting if the grounds upon which it
1 rarely reaches the public.
to ~he other JUStl~s for revte~. was laid down have vanished long
When the court announced its · ' Whtte also ~d not ctrcul~ted ~ dis- since, and the rule simply persists
ruling in the Georgia case, Powell ·sent. Pow_ell, .801.t~c~s satd, sunply from blind imitation of the past."
d a one-paragrap
.
h concur{lng
. . .-£hanged
.
his. nund.
The rulin g provoked a f'trestorm
..
, p .
'd . h'
tssue
1
11
?Pinion. explaining why he_was join- con~r~~;~~;lmoiwfnn:~ce~ ~~ of criticism. eivil ri~hts groups said
mg Wh1te. He strongly hmted that June 301"a prison sentence for such the court.was treating h~sexu~l~
he w?uld not vote t~ uphold such conduct-certainly a sentence of much as 1t treated bla~ks ~them
laws m future ca~s ..if l~wyers .ar~ lteng duration •. ·' for-a single pri- famou~ Dred Scott ruling m 1857,
gued that excesstve p~son terms vate consensual act ·of sodomy . . . ~~~n 1t , decl~red blacks w_ere. no~
for . h_om?Sexual a~s . ~1olated _the would .create a '.serious Eighth
c1tizen~ entitled to constltutiona\
const1tuttonal proh1~rt1on agamst Amendment issije." , .
protections.
.
.
.
But Hardwick -bas not been
The Bowers v. ll_a!dw.ck rulm~
cruel and unusual purushment.
Powell felt that a homqsexual tried " Powell said "nwch less con- also could mark a cnt1cal departure
from the court's 30-year willing,might be able to argue that his or victed and sente~ced. Moreover
h~r sexual orientati~n was part_of (Hardwick) has not raised th~ n~ss to ~~em . new constitutional
h1s or her natural bemg, companng ' Eighth Amendment ·issue" in the nghts wtthm the "penumbras" of
it to the way drug addicts can argue lower courts. .
the broad language of the Constitbat their addiction is beyond their
Powell said he was joining White tution and to declare certain matcontrol. Thus, in Powell's view, if because "' cannot say that conduct ters-such as contraception or
the state imposed criminal sane~ condemned for hundreds of years abortion-virtually off-limits to
tions, especially the 20-year jail has now become a fundamental state regulation.
sentence -Georgia set ~or a single right." ·
The case, ~owever, may not be
act of s~my, that would violate
White's brief opinion said Hard- over. Hardwtck, who spent 12
the cruel and ilnusua• punishment wick was asking the court to say the hours locked up after his arrest and
ban in the Eighth Amendment..
Constitution protected private, con- who claimed harassment because of
Powell, sources said, dislikes an- sensual homosexual conduct.
his homosexuality, may yet be given
"This we are quite unwilling to a chance to argue in the lower
tisodomy laws, feeling that they are
useless, never enforced and. unen- dQ," White said, noting the "ancient courts that his rights Uflder the
forceable. In the case bef~re the roots" of bans against sodomy and Eight Amendment were violated.

